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Purpose:   The aim of this study is to investigate whether the choice of 
payment method in mergers and acquisitions is determined by the 
credit rating existence of the bidder and if the credit rating level 
has an impact of the financing source. 
 
Methodology:  The methods used are Probit and GLM logit regressions. The 
dependent variables are payment method and fraction of cash with 
credit rating and credit rating level as the explanatory variables. It 
has been based on the same methodology as Karampatsas et al 
(2014) and Faccio and Masulis (2005). 
 
Theoretical perspective:  The theoretical review consists of previous research on credit 
ratings and their impact on the payment method, as well as 
underlying theory of capital structure such as Trade-off theory and 
Pecking Order theory, and the influence of credit rating agencies. 
 
Empirical foundation:  The thesis is based on long-term foreign credit ratings from 
Moody’s and S&P and financial data from 220 firms. The time 
frame for the sample is between 2000 and 2008.  
 
Conclusion:   The outcome of this study suggests that there is a negative 
correlation between credit rating and payment method, hence firms 
with credit rating are more likely to pay with equity. Instead of 
maximizing their debt levels, when the market timing is right to 
issue equity, firms rather want to maintain financial flexibility and 
the possibility to raise debt for future investments. We found no 
relationship between the level of credit rating a firms holds and the 
payment method.  
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1 Introduction 
This thesis is about how the credit rating of a company influences the payment method in 
mergers and acquisitions. In the first chapter we give a background to the problem (1.1) and 
then in section 1.2 prior research is discussed that have been conducted within the topic. 
Thereafter, the research questions and the purpose are presented. 
 
1.1 Background 
The Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have played an important part over the years and in their 
role they are specialized in gathering and evaluating information regarding the 
creditworthiness of a company (Kisgen, 2007). 
 
“The rating agencies had an almost godlike status in the eyes of some investors. Now that 
trust is gone. It’s been replaced with a feeling of betrayal.” (Strier, 2008: 539) 
 
The above quotation, by a previous analyst at Moody’s, indicates the importance of the 
CRAs’ status. During the last decade they have been scrutinized several times due to different 
scandals, the case of Enron in 2001 made many question the trustworthiness of the credit 
ratings. It was one of the largest accounting frauds ever accounted for where the executives 
falsely inflated the revenues of the company. Another factor contributing to the fall of the 
company was the rating-linked consequences of the credit rating downgrade, which triggered 
a series of events and liquidity crises of many companies. The downgraded rating of below 
investment grade led Enron to face debt payments of $3.9 billion that contributed to their 
bankruptcy (Kisgen, 2007). Furthermore, the CRAs have been subject to a lot of criticism 
after the recent financial crisis, which has resulted in them being investigated. The motive 
behind is that the CRAs provided inaccurate ratings on structured finance products just before 
they collapsed and went into bankruptcy (Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2011; Jarrow and Xu, 2010). 
Why were there not any predictions of it? Jarrow and Xu (2010) argued that the answer partly 
lies in the incentive conflict, where the rated firms are paying the rating agencies. This 
payment conflict can produce inaccurate ratings. 
                                                                              
The reason for the CRAs’ importance is that the assigned credit rating of a firm can affect it 
indirectly in various ways, among others the firm’s financing decisions and investment 
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policies (Tang, 2009). If a company is able to maintain a certain credit rating it could give 
them potential benefits such as signalling information about the quality of the firm that is not 
publicly available. A downgrade of the company could instead result in costly consequences, 
such as higher cost of capital (Kisgen, 2007). The credit ratings are therefore said to have an 
impact on decisions regarding the capital structure of the company. 
 
The capital structure plays a major part in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) investments 
when it comes to the financing decision. The choice of the financing source is to some extent 
explained by the Pecking Order of capital structure (Myers, 1984), but it is also influenced by 
the bidder’s strategic preferences in regards to the means of payment (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2009). The trend in financing with cash versus stock in takeovers has varied 
considerably during the years. In general terms, cash is mostly used when the company has 
higher cash holdings due to for instance economic tailwind. If stock on the other hand is used 
for the financing it is mostly due to that it is overvalued (Gaughan, 2007). In most cases a mix 
of the two is employed since there is evidence that the target company might be more 
reluctant to accept the payment if it is only with overvalued stock (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014).  
After the financial crisis, but also initiated before, policymakers both in the US and in Europe 
started imposing regulations on the CRAs in order to address the problems associated with the 
industry (Voorhees, 2012). But is it enough? The criticism that the CRAs have been subject to 
has resulted in vast amount of publication and partly due to the lack of competition they are 
still very powerful today. 
 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
Many researchers have studied the area of credit ratings and its agencies. There is no doubt 
that credit ratings are a hot topic, since it has been shown that they are able to influence a 
firm’s financial decision. The underlying theory of capital structure is that firms follow a 
pecking order, suggesting that firms should first of all use internally generated cash, followed 
by debt and least equity (Myers, 1984). On the other hand, a common perception is that the 
credit rating has a significant impact on a firm’s investments and financing decision and a lot 
of studies support this view (Bannier et al., 2012, Bo et al., 2008, Gul et al., 2009, Kisgen, 
2006, 2007). This can partly be explained by the possibility for firms to signal information 
through their credit rating, without conveying information to the public (Kisgen, 2007). 
Information asymmetries can be reduced in the market through refined credit ratings and 
investors can more easily identify the firm’s credit quality. Therefore, credit rating influences, 
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partly through reduced information asymmetry, the choice of investment fund (Tang, 2009). 
Previous research has shown a relationship between a firm’s investment rate and a change in 
rating. A positive rating announcement results in an increased investment rate and vice versa. 
Hence, in the period following a credit rating upgrade firms tend to invest more, as a result of 
a change in the firm’s cost of capital (Bannier et al., 2012; Gul et al., 2009). The conventional 
view suggests that a firm’s credit reputation has significant impact when the firm is seeking 
external debt financing. High credit rating indicates a sound financial quality of the firm and it 
can access more external debt to a lower cost, which explains why firms choose to invest 
more when they reach a better rating (Gul et al., 2009). Kisgen (2006) investigated to what 
extent credit ratings directly affect capital structure decisions. The results show that firms near 
a credit rating change, upgrade or downgrade, issue less debt relative to equity compared to 
firms with a stable rating. Firms that face a risk of being downgraded avoid to issue debt since 
the likelihood of being downgraded increases substantially, which leads to a higher cost of 
debt. Firms near an upgrade will face a higher market value and prefer to issue equity instead 
of debt. Bo et al. (2008) found that the relation between credit ratings and investment is 
nonlinear, which violates the conventional view. Instead, the relationship can be represented 
by an inverted U-curve, which is explained by managers’ fear of getting downgraded. To 
conclude, higher rating is beneficial because it gives the firm access to cheaper debt. On the 
other hand, managers may prefer to issue equity instead due to high market valuation or may 
be too afraid to invest anything at all. 
 
The research above tells us that there are many features that influence the choice of financing 
in an investment opportunity. The same factors influence the choice of payment method in 
M&As. Harford et al. (2009) found that when a bidder’s leverage exceeds the target level set 
by the management, it is more likely to finance the deal with equity. Usually, when studying 
this area, two extremes develop. The theoretical literature suggests that an acquirer either pay 
with cash or stocks, even though the majority of deals include a mix of payment. Furthermore, 
the mix of cash and equity also delivers information (La Bruslerie, 2013). The market timing 
theory suggests that firms are more prone to issue stock when the stock is overvalued 
(Vermaelen and Xu, 2014). Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argued that this is a too 
simplistic explanation since the target may not accept the payment of overvalued stock. They 
extended the study and the result showed that the offer is more likely to contain a higher 
fraction of stocks due to higher misvaluations when the market is overvalued. The findings 
are supported by Harford (2005), who argued that some mergers are driven by consistent 
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pricing errors in the market. Burch et al. (2012) results indicated that stock offers are also 
more likely to be accepted when target's shareholders face substantial capital gains on tax 
liabilities, since stock offers allow target’s shareholders to defer capital gain taxes. According 
to the Pecking Order theory, firms prefer to use internally generated funds as a source of 
financing. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) investigated how European acquirers chose to 
finance cash offers and found that external sources of both debt and equity are commonly 
used. The findings suggest that investors worries that deals financed with internally generated 
cash are driven by empire building1 motives, while debt financed deals signal that the stock 
may not be overvalued. The study showed that financing decisions are partly determined by 
the cost of external capital, but also by the strategic preferences of the bidder. 
 
The choice of payment method can have an affect on the completion of a transaction, whether 
it is successful or not. Furthermore, in the context of M&As it is a well-studied topic, 
although there is still a significant gap in trying to explain the determinants of payment 
method (Ismail and Krause, 2010). Faccio and Masulis (2005) studied the choice of payment 
method in European mergers and acquisitions. The study included both public and private 
targets in the period 1997-2000. The researchers investigated the trade-off between bidder 
corporate control threats, which discourage stock financing, and bidder financing constraints, 
which encourage stock financing. In summary, both bidder’s financial condition and 
corporate control concerns have a clear influence on European M&A financing 
choices.  Karampatsas et al. (2014) studied the US market during the years 1998-2009. They 
found a new determinant of the payment method in M&As; a firm’s credit rating level. 
Furthermore, firms with higher rating are associated with better access to the public debt 
market and lower financial constraints. Therefore, bidders holding a high rating level are 
more likely to use cash financing in a takeover. 
 
There has not been conducted any research outside the US market concerning the relationship 
between credit ratings and payment method in M&As. Therefore we would like to fill the gap 
and conduct the study on European firms. As argued by Faccio and Masulis (2005) the 
European market is an ideal venue for research in the area of credit ratings and payment 
methods. Europe has access to a wide range of capital markets and is an integrated market 
that is characterized by institutional settings, laws and regulations. Since both credit rating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Empire building refers to when a manager is more concerned with expanding the size of the company rather than trying to allocate the 
resources in an optimal way (Ogden et al. 2003).  
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and payment method have excessive amounts of underlying theory, it would be interesting to 
combine the two of them on the European market to see whether the results would differ from 
the US market. In order to investigate this research topic, a combination of Karampatsas et al. 
(2014) and Faccio and Masulis (2005) studies’ methodology is applied in order to get a 
trustworthy result. 
 
1.3 Research Question 
Based on the above discussion the thesis will be focused on examining the following; 
- Is the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions determined by the credit rating 
existence of the bidder? 
- Among rated firms, does the level of credit rating has an impact on the choice of financing 
source? 
 
1.4 Purpose 
The aim of this paper is to investigate to what extent a firm's credit rating influences the 
choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions on the European market. A bidder that 
holds a credit rating faces better access to public debt markets and firms with higher rating 
have relatively better opportunities to raise debt. Hence, we would like to investigate if the 
relationship holds in order to see whether it affects the choice of payment method. 
 
1.5 Delimitations 
The time period for the study is between the years 2000 and 2008, covering the last complete 
M&A wave and all the steps in a financial cycle. The results could be limited by the fact that 
the time frame does not show the current situation on the market. However, the period after 
2008 has been characterized by low M&A activity (McGee, 2014) and we believe that the 
time period for a complete M&A wave will result in a more representative sample. The 
inclusion of the financial crisis and an incomplete financial cycle could have led to a more 
skewed sample. The sample is based on firms on the European market, which is represented 
by developed countries that contribute to 90% of Europe’s GDP. If all the countries in Europe 
would have been included this would probably have given us a more unequal sample, 
therefore in order to be able to answer our research question better and to have a comparable 
sample, the study has been limited to developed countries. 
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The credit ratings that have been used is foreign long-term and has been derived from 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. The chosen credit rating agencies have in total 80% of the 
total market and we assume that most companies rely on the ratings from these agencies. 
However, they weight the risks in their ratings somewhat differently. This may affect our 
result since not all firms in our sample are rated by both of them or they could have been 
assigned different ratings. Nevertheless, we do not think this will have a significant impact on 
our result.   
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the previous research necessary for understanding the 
underlying theory of capital structure and payment methods in M&A, followed by supporting 
theories regarding credit ratings. 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology of the thesis 
In the third chapter, we will motivate the chosen methodology approach. Also, the sample 
selection will be described more thoroughly. The relevant variables and the econometric 
techniques employed will be presented in order to conduct the study. 
 
Chapter 4: Empirical results 
The empirical findings from our study will be presented in this chapter conducted from the 
methodology in the previous chapter, beginning with descriptive statistics of the collected 
sample followed by the results from the regressions. 
 
Chapter 5: Analysis 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the outcome of the results from chapter 4. The previous 
research in this area that has been presented before will be connected to the findings and the 
result will be discussed. 
 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion and suggestion for further research 
In the last chapter the conclusions of the study will be presented. It also consists of the 
contributions of our study and suggestions for further research. 
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2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
This chapter is the foundation of our study and will give an understanding of the previous 
research that it has been based on. The focus will be on developing the theories around our 
main variables; credit rating agencies, capital structure and payment method in M&As. 
 
2.1 Credit Rating Agencies 
CRAs are often seen as information producers, the markets are characterized by information 
asymmetries in the sense that the true creditworthiness of a firm is private to the issuers. The 
role of the CRAs is to assess the issuers’ ability to repay investors, in other words evaluating 
their credit quality (Fulghieri et al., 2014). Investors on the other hand cannot directly observe 
the agency’s rating policy but must rely on past performance of the agency in order to assess 
their credibility. This can be summarized as their reputation, which is measured by the debt-
paying records of previously rated issuers (ibid.). The credit ratings are employed by a 
number of market participants, including countries, governments and companies for issuing 
debt. The credit rating process of the CRAs includes analysing both the business risk and the 
financial risk (Frost, 2007). The business risk is referring to the industry, competitive position 
of the company and the quality of the management. Financial risk is on the other hand 
referring to financial policy, capital structure and financial flexibility (ibid.). 
 
There are roughly 150 CRAs on the market but it is dominated by three main actors, most 
often referred to as the “Big Three”; Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investor Service 
and Fitch. Together they have a combined market share of around 95%. However, S&P and 
Moody’s have around 80% of the market whilst Fitch has 15% (De Haan and Amtenbrink, 
2011). The reason for the low competition is that the industry of credit ratings are 
characterized by high barriers to enter and the fact that it takes time for an agency to build up 
a reputation and gain trust (Cane et al. 2012). Their strong position is also due to regulations 
and the oligopolistic structure of the rating industry, which is restricted by high minimum size 
and high front-end cost (Tichy, 2011). The structure of the credit ratings for the three main 
actors are very similar, they are all expressed on a scale of letters and are divided into two 
categories; investment-grade and non-investment grade (speculative). The ratings for S&P 
and Fitch differ somewhat from the one of Moody’s, they use plus and minus on their rating 
modifiers, whereas Moody’s uses numbers. For instance, AA+/AA- from S&P is the same as 
Aa1/Aa3 from Moody’s (Hill et al., 2010). 
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The CRAs have been criticized during the last decade in several areas; one of them is the lack 
of transparency when it comes to their assessments. It is not revealed which criteria their 
ratings are based on or the methods employed to come up with them. The three main CRAs 
seem to weigh different criteria similarly but Moody’s seem to place more weight on external 
debt and less on default history as negative factor than the other two (Tichy, 2011). 
Furthermore, CRAs generally have placed a lot of weight to debt-to-export ratios, which has 
turned out to be quite poor predictors of financial stress. Indicators of liquidity and currency 
misalignments have been given less weight, which instead has shown to be useful in both 
predicting currency and debt crises (Reinhart, 2002). Already in the beginning of the financial 
crises there was an intense discussion about the methods that the CRAs use but their market 
power and the high barriers to enter was also under criticism. Since they are very influential 
on the cost of funding, they can easily make an impact on the market by a downgrade or just 
an announcement of a possible future downgrade. Furthermore, the conflict of interest is 
another problem associated with the CRAs, referred to as the “issuer-pays” model where the 
issuer could influence the term of their rating (Eijffinger, 2012). This problem will be 
discussed more in detail in the next section. The defence that is used by the CRAs, to all the 
criticism they have received, is the freedom of speech. They argue that the rating is only an 
expression of their opinion, instead of being viewed as expert advice. This creates a problem; 
the CRAs see their ratings as only opinions while other major market participants are most 
often encouraged or forced to use them (Cane et al., 2012). 
 
2.1.1 Agency Conflict 
There are three actors that contribute to the principal-agent conflict: CRAs, issuers and 
investors. These conflicts mainly stem from the revenue bias (also referred to as the “issuer-
pays” model), i.e. the CRAs are paid by the issuer and not by the investors. The CRAs assign 
ratings to the issuer’s financial instrument and the investors are in turn interested in investing 
in them (Voorhees, 2012). The issuer must then decide which CRA to choose, partly basing 
the decision on whether the investor will see the received rating as valuable or not. However, 
they tend to choose a CRA that would assign a higher rating which in turn would make them 
more appealing to investors. The CRA on the other hand wants to issue the most correct 
rating in order to be able to maintain its reputation but at the same time, it wants to issue the 
most favourable rating as to not lose its customer. This would mean losing the fee the CRA 
would receive by issuing the rating (Minescu, 2010). In a study by Covitz and Harrison 
(2003) they investigated this conflict; whether there is more incentive for the CRAs to favour 
	   9	  
issuer interests - conflict of interest hypothesis - or investor interests - reputation hypothesis. 
They come to the conclusion that even though the issuer has paid the CRA, they do not feel 
forced to give a favourable credit rating since it is quite common for an issuer to choose more 
than one agency. The reason is to increase the credibility. Instead, Covitz and Harrison (2003) 
found evidence that it is the reputation hypothesis that is the dominating one.  
 
There are several ways in which the CRAs are trying to mitigate the conflicts of interest, not 
at least is it enforced upon them through regulations (Strier, 2008; Voorhees, 2012). For 
instance, the CRAs are required to provide information regarding conflicts of interest and how 
they address and manage them (Strier, 2008). On the other hand, Schwarcz (2004) argued that 
the CRAs already are motivated to assign accurate credit ratings due to the fact that their 
profitability is tied to their reputation. The reputation can be seen as a substitute for 
regulation; it drives the accountability that normally is accomplished through the processes of 
regulations. Another way the CRAs deal with the conflict of interest, in addition to 
regulations, is by assuring that the employed analysts are not compensated in relation to their 
contribution to the CRAs revenue or have any interest such as personal or economic in the 
rated company. Since the independence of employees has not been vividly discussed after the 
recent financial crisis it is generally believed that this has been handled properly (Johansson, 
2010). 
 
The conflicts of interest basically stem from that before 1970, investors paid for the ratings. 
When they became able to conduct their own analysis, the willingness for paying for the 
credit assessment disappeared, which led to the introduction of the “issuer-pay” model 
(Johansson, 2010). Furthermore, the CRAs cannot in advance know which investors that are 
interested in purchasing a certain financial instrument. Even though they did, it would be 
difficult to persuade each investor into paying their portion of the rating fee (Schwarcz, 2004). 
Therefore, there seem to be little alternative to the “issuer-pay” model at the moment. To take 
into consideration is the fact that the CRAs are private companies; they are not regulated 
neither at any country nor at a governmental level. Moreover, when they conduct the credit 
rating it is only the creditworthiness of the investment that is considered, not in relation to the 
economic desirability to the investors (ibid.). 
 
Even though all the above-mentioned criticism towards the CRAs, credit ratings play an 
important part in financing decisions today and their role should not be ignored. There is 
evidence that the effect of a credit downgrade or upgrade signals significant information 
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about the economic situation of a firm (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). A downgrade associated 
with declining financial outlook signals new negative information to the market, whilst a 
downgrade due to changes in a firm’s leverage convey no new negative information to the 
market. The downgrade associated with changes in a firm’s leverage is bad news for 
bondholders but it could be good news for stockholders. If the firm gets downgraded because 
the CRA believes that there will be an increase in leverage, it will result in a transfer of 
wealth from the bondholders to the stockholders (Goh and Ederington, 1993). This in turn is 
one of the most important agency conflicts.    
 
2.1.2 Information Asymmetry 
To improve the efficiency of the market, the CRAs act as “informational intermediaries” 
between the issuer and the investors. This increases the transparency of the financial 
instruments, which leads to reduction of information asymmetries in the market (Schwarcz, 
2004). Information asymmetry is one of the market imperfections and refers to a situation 
where one of the participants in a transaction has more information than the other party. This 
could lead to that the participant with more information takes advantage of the other party’s 
lack of knowledge (Ogden et al., 2003). 
 
In a study by Gatchev et al. (2009), the results showed that both agency costs and information 
asymmetry play an important role in the financing decisions of the firm. This finding is 
consistent with Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) who also argued that asymmetric 
information plays an important part. The information asymmetry can affect the firm’s demand 
for investments but results show that financial constraint factors, e.g. credit ratings, respond to 
market imperfections (Campello and Chen, 2010). 
 
The issuer provides the information, which is used to assign a credit rating by the CRAs. The 
rating does not cover the risk of fraud and the actual significance of it depends in the end on 
the reputation among investors of the CRA. Hence, to consider is that the credit rating is not 
more reliable than the information provided by the issuer (Schwarcz, 2004). Moreover, Gan 
(2004) argued that CRAs give worse ratings to unsolicited issues due to adjustments for 
difference in true and unobserved quality. Therefore, issuers that have better private 
information will self select a CRA and reveal private information in order to receive a higher 
credit rating.  
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In order to reduce the information asymmetries, there is evidence that this could be done 
through credit ratings. Chou and Cheng (2012) argued that diversifying firms are associated 
with higher information asymmetries due to investors’ lack of knowledge about more than 
some of these segments, hence diversifying firms are traded at a discount. They found that 
this discount was reduced when information asymmetries were mitigated by credit ratings. 
Both credit ratings existence and level of credit rating reduced information asymmetries; 
therefore also the discount. Moreover, He et al. (2011) found evidence that is in line with this 
but supports more the signalling hypothesis. The credit rating reveals private information 
about a firm, this in turn becomes the link between debt and stock value uncertainties. A 
better credit rating or an upgrade signals that the debt value has lower uncertainty; which in 
turn would mean that the lower level of information asymmetry signals lower uncertainty 
regarding the stock value (the link).  
 
2.2 Underlying Theory of Capital Structure 
Managers consider credit rating as one of the most important determinants when they make 
decisions about the firm’s capital structure (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Managers daily face 
decisions on how to finance different investment opportunities. It is a difficult decision and 
the wrong choice of financing source can be devastating for a firm. Issuing debt raises 
concerns about financial flexibility and credit ratings, while dilution and the value of the stock 
are the main concerns in the choice of issuing equity (ibid). The concern about the value of a 
firm’s equity is driven by the market timing theory, which suggests that a firm wants to issue 
equity when its stock is highly valued and repurchase stock when the market value of its stock 
is low (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). It is shown that the market timing largely influences a 
firm’s real financial policy and capital structure is the outcome of past attempts to time the 
market (ibid). Harford (2005) argued that according to the behavioural model, which focuses 
on asset misvaluation, acquisitions are driven by overvalued equity. Vermaelen and Xu 
(2014) investigated the market timing theory in relation to acquisitions. They argued that 
bidders want to pay with overvalued stock, but the target shareholders will not accept this. 
Hence, overvalued stock can only be used when it is justified as the optimal capital structure. 
Many researchers have tried to address the problem in search for the optimal capital structure 
and there are two main theories that have been developed within this area: the Trade-off 
theory and the Pecking Order theory. 
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2.2.1 Trade-off Theory 
Miller and Modigliani (1958) early studied the importance of capital structure for a firm’s 
market value. They assumed perfect capital markets and found that a firm’s market value is 
independent of its capital structure. However, there are no such perfect capital markets. Firms 
have to pay corporate taxes and a manager’s decision on capital structure can lead the firm 
into bankruptcy. Therefore, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) introduced corporate taxes and 
bankruptcy costs into the model, and a trade-off emerged. Debt is a cheap source of financing 
and it carries the benefit of being tax deductible. Thus, it also increases the firm’s probability 
of default. The relationship between an increased amount of debt and a firm’s market value is 
positive and linear, until the benefits of the tax shield is offset by the increased costs of 
financial distress. Therefore, it is possible to find the optimal capital structure that maximizes 
the value of the firm.  
 
Although the trade-off theory is well known in the academic world, there are still other factors 
that influence the decision of capital structure and make managers deviate from this theory. 
The trade-off is based on the fact that debt is a cheap source of financing and always 
accessible. The availability and cost of debt may differ depending on the risk of lending to the 
company. Credit ratings are a commonly used measurement of the firm’s risk, even though it 
should be considered only as an opinion according to the CRAs. However, it has been shown 
that credit rating has an affect on a firm’s capital structure and also on the trade-off theory. 
Kisgen (2006) included the costs (benefits) of different credit rating levels into the trade-off 
theory. He found that, in some cases, a credit rating level and its associated costs influence a 
firm’s capital structure and results in a deviation from its optimal capital structure suggested 
by the trade-off theory. He also found that firms close to a credit rating change are more 
reluctant to issue debt. If they would issue more debt when they are close to a rating change it 
could lead to a downgrade. This in turn could result in a change in their cost of capital. These 
findings suggest that investors require a return based on a firm’s credit rating rather than a 
firm’s debt level. Flannery et al. (2012) partly support this view, but found stronger evidence 
for the trade-off theory. A firm’s credit spread reflects expected future changes in its leverage 
and these expectations that the investors have are mainly based on the Trade-off theory. Even 
though the findings are ambiguous, we can draw the conclusion that both credit rating and the 
Trade-off theory influence a company’s cost of capital. 
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However, firms deviate from their target capital structure (Leary and Roberts, 2005), and 
Kisgen (2007) evidence shows that credit rating is one reason. Specifically firms with 
investment grade rating do not follow the trade-off theory and even increase their debt levels 
when the level is above the target ratio. This is instead supported by the other main theory 
within capital structure; the pecking order. 
 
2.2.2 Pecking Order Theory 
Myers (1984) questioned the Trade-off theory and developed the Pecking Order theory based 
on his findings. The two models disagree when a firm’s debt ratio is above the target ratio but 
below its debt capacity. In this case, the Trade-off theory suggests that the firm should 
decrease its leverage while the Pecking Order theory suggests an increase (Jong et al., 2011). 
As mentioned above, the pecking order is shown to be superior to the Trade-off theory in 
some cases. The theory suggests that managers follows a pecking order in the decision of the 
firm’s capital structure and should first of all use internally generated funds, followed by debt 
and least equity (Myers, 1984). Firms follow the pecking order due to information 
asymmetries, both in the choice of internal and external funds and between debt and equity. 
The research in this area indicates different result. Lemmon and Zender (2010) found support 
for the theory. They argued that if external funds are required, debt is preferred over equity, 
but only when the firm do not need to consider its debt capacity. Hence, equity issuance is 
mainly driven by debt capacity concerns. Leary and Roberts (2010) found support for a more 
liberal pecking order, but the theory is driven by incentive conflicts rather than information 
asymmetry. Frank and Goyal (2003) found some contradicting results. First of all, internal 
financing is not sufficient and firms commonly use external financing. Second, debt and 
equity are equally used. However, there was support for the Pecking Order theory among 
large firms. The results from Fama and French (2005) showed that firms issue equity, both 
frequently and that the issuance is large. They argued that these firms have benefits that 
outweigh the costs of issuing equity. 
 
As shown, the literature about the Pecking Order theory is, as well as the Trade-off theory, 
ambiguous. However, a majority of the findings suggest that if there is evidence for the 
pecking order it is due to information asymmetry. Hsin-Han Shen (2014) found that firms 
prefer to issue debt when information asymmetries increase, but also find that the access to 
debt decreases simultaneously. This means that firms associated with high information 
asymmetry experience limited access to debt markets and hence restricted condition to raise 
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debt, which is where the role of CRAs comes into play. CRAs are seen as information 
intermediaries, as have been mentioned in the previous section, and credit ratings reduces the 
information asymmetries in capital markets (Chou and Cheng, 2012). There is little research 
about CRAs role for the Pecking Order theory, but Jong et al. (2011) argued that firms with 
investment grade rating have less restricted debt capacity. Instead, they consider marginal 
debt ratio that would make a firm lose its investment grade rating and found that the pecking 
order explains a majority of their sample. 
 
The lack of research about the relationship between credit rating and the Pecking Order theory 
can instead be examined through studies of the relationship between credit rating and capital 
structure. Based on the argument that credit ratings reduce the information asymmetry in 
capital markets, a suggestion would be that credit ratings may not change the pecking order in 
a firm’s financing decision, but it might alleviate the costs between the different choices of 
financing. 
 
2.2.4 Credit Rating and Capital Structure  
Neither the Trade-off theory nor the pecking order models explicitly take credit ratings into 
account (Kisgen, 2007). Although some findings of these theories can explain credit ratings 
impact on a firm’s capital structure, we can see that the choice of financing in investment 
decisions is mainly driven by information asymmetry and debt capacity concerns. Credit 
ratings can be connected to both of these findings. The existence of credit ratings reduces 
information asymmetry in capital markets and investors can more easily identify the firm’s 
credit quality (Tang, 2009). Firms with higher credit rating face better access to capital market 
and lower cost of borrowing, hence also an increased debt capacity. Firms with a lower rating 
have higher cost of debt and less access to capital markets, but still better conditions than 
unrated firms due to differences in information asymmetries. Debt becomes cheaper for a high 
rated firm, but the same relationship is not found for equity (ibid). Kliger and Sarig (2000) 
even showed that equity value falls when better rating is announced. This supports the asset 
substitution theory that bondholders benefit from risk reduction in form of increased debt 
value, whereas shareholders have the subordinated claim. On the other hand, Kisgen (2006) 
found that firms close to an upgrade have a high market value and are more likely to issue 
equity rather than debt. It is not only beneficial for investors when information asymmetries 
are reduced. Firms can also benefit from the possibility of signalling without conveying the 
information to the market (Kisgen, 2007). 
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Many theories assume that firms always want to maximize their debt capacity, and their 
research of financing choice are based on this simplified assumption, but this is not always the 
case. For instance, managers may want to avoid downgrades by cutting risky investment 
projects and stay far from using the firm’s maximum debt capacity (Bo et al., 2008). Even 
though some studies showed that investment increase when a firm reaches a better rating due 
to lower cost of capital (Gul et al. 2009), it does not necessary mean that it reaches its 
maximum debt capacity. Instead, by keeping a good rating, firms leave space for raising debt 
at low cost whenever it is needed. This shows that there are many variables that affect a firm’s 
choice of financing in an investment opportunity. 
 
Firms still value credit ratings very high, even though it has been argued by the CRAs that it 
should only be considered as an opinion. The fact that firms think it is important to have good 
rating influences the market’s perception (Kisgen, 2007). Investors trust CRAs to the extent 
that they are willing to rely on a third party for their investment decisions (Bo et al., 2008). 
Credit ratings are important, both in the eyes of firms and their potential investors. The ratings 
reduce information asymmetry and partly determine a firm’s debt capacity, but there are also 
other factors affecting the choice of financing source. Firms also take reputation into account 
and may not always act rational. To conclude, credit ratings largely affect investment 
decisions, even to the extent that merger deals sometimes depends on if the firms involved 
can maintain their credit level (Kisgen, 2007). 
 
2.3 Payment Method in M&As 
There has been conducted an extensive amount of research in order to determine the method 
of payment choice. Faccio and Masulis (2005), Harford et al. (2009) and Uysal (2011) 
investigated the impact of a firm’s debt capacity on the financing decision of payment 
between cash and stock. Faccio and Masulis (2005) studied the European market of M&As; 
they wanted to investigate the payment choice of the bidder. They found that the trade-off 
between corporate governance concerns and debt-financing constraints largely influence on 
the payment choice of the bidder. Harford et al. (2009) examined how bidders choose to 
finance acquisitions but instead looked at deviations from bidder’s target debt ratios, which 
they use as a measure of debt capacity. His results showed that if the bidder’s leverage is over 
its target level, the acquisition is more likely financed with equity than with debt. Uysal 
(2011) complemented the study by as well examining deviations from the bidder’s target debt 
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ratio. Although, in his study he found that managers take the deviations from the target into 
account when planning acquisitions. 
 
There are several studies regarding credit ratings and capital structure that are directly related 
to our study. Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Kisgen (2006, 2009) and Lemmon and Zender 
(2010) all examined the relationship. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) suggested that a firm 
with better access to public bond markets have significantly more leverage. They used the 
debt rating as a proxy for whether the company has access to the capital market or not, 
examining the US market between the years 1986 and 2000. Their results showed that firms 
that have access to the public bond market have 35% more leverage. Even though a firm with 
a credit rating is fundamentally different, this does not affect the results as it is controlled for 
firm characteristics. Kisgen (2006) followed the same intuition that a credit rating has an 
impact on a firm’s capital structure but instead took it a bit further by examining the impact of 
the rating on the capital structure decisions. He found that a firm that is close to either a credit 
downgrade or upgrade issue less debt than equity in relation to a firm that instead is not near a 
change in their credit rating. The sample consists of US firms during the years 1986 to 2001. 
In a more recent study by Kisgen (2009), he extended his research by studying whether 
managers target credit ratings when making capital structure decisions, i.e. the leverage 
behaviour following a credit rating change. The sample period differ somewhat from the 
previous study, between the years 1987 and 2003 but still only covers US firms. In his 
previous study (Kisgen, 2006), financial companies and utilities were not excluded but instead 
controlled for whereas in this study he excluded them. Furthermore, the outcome of the 
research suggested that firms react asymmetrically to rating changes; a firm lowers the 
leverage after a downgrade but responds little to upgrades. Kisgen (2009) argued that 
managers target specific minimum credit ratings and that a complete model of capital 
structure must include credit rating with standard tax, information, agency and financial 
distress factors. Finally, the study by Lemmon and Zender (2010) investigated the impact of 
debt capacity on capital structure. They used credit rating as a proxy for the debt capacity: 
whether the firm has high likelihood of being able to access the public debt market. Their 
results imply that if external funds are required, without considering concerns regarding the 
debt capacity, debt seems to be preferred to equity. The use of new external equity financing 
by listed firms is to a large extent explained by the concerns over debt capacity. Hence, the 
pecking order seems to give a good description of financing behaviour. 
 
	   17	  
There has been one previous study that has investigated the same relationship between credit 
rating and payment method similar to what we conduct, although it based on the American 
market. Karampatsas et al (2014) found that the bidders in M&As that have assigned high 
level of credit rating are more likely to use cash payment as financing source. They associate 
this result to that highly rated bidders experience lower financial constraints and better access 
to public debt markets. The time period for their sample is between the years 1998 and 2009 
and consists of 6819 observations, where 1747 firm are rated.  
 
The previous studies, which has been discussed above, that are the most relevant and 
important for our thesis are being presented in the table below. 
 
Table 1 - Overview of previous studies 
 
 
 
Authors Years Market S tudy R esult
F accio	  and	  Masulis 	  (2005) 1997-­‐2000 Europe M&A	  payment	  choices 	  of	  bidders 	  
1986-­‐2000 US
K isgen	  (2006,	  2007) 1986-­‐2001 US
K isgen	  (2009) 1987-­‐2003 US
Harford	  et	  al.	  (2009) 1981-­‐2000 US
L emmon	  and	  Zender	  (2010) 1971-­‐2000 US
Uysal	  (2011) 1990-­‐2007 US
Karampatsas 	  et	  al.	  (2014) 1998-­‐2009 US
Trade-­‐off	  between	  corporate	  governance	  concerns 	  
(dilution	  of	  control)	  and	  debt	  financing	  constraints 	  
influence	  the	  choice	  of	  payment
F aulkender	  and	  P etersen	  
(2006)
F irm	  with	  better	  access 	  to	  public	  
bond	  market	  have	  s ignificantly	  
more	  debt	  (credit	  rating	  as 	  a	  proxy	  
for	  acess 	  to	  bond	  market)
F irms	  with	  access 	  to	  the	  public	  bond	  market	  have	  
35% 	  more	  leverage
How	  credit	  rating	  affects 	  choice	  of	  
payment	  in	  M&As
F irm	  close	  to	  a	  downgrade	  or	  upgrade	  issue	  less 	  
debt	  than	  equity
L everage	  behavior	  following	  a	  
credit	  rating	  change
F irms	  react	  asymmetrically	  to	  rating	  changes;	  a	  
firm	  lowers 	  the	  leverage	  after	  a	  downgrade	  but	  
responds 	  little	  to	  upgrades
How	  deviation	  from	  target	  capital	  
s tructure	  affect	  M&A	  payment	  
choices
When	  bidder's 	  leverage	  is 	  above	  its 	  target	  level,	  
equity	  is 	  more	  frequently	  used	  than	  debt
C redit	  rating	  as 	  a	  proxy	  for	  access 	  
to	  public	  debt	  market	  affect	  capital	  
s tructure	  decis ions
If	  external	  funds 	  are	  required,	  without	  cons idering	  
concerns 	  regarding	  the	  debt	  capacity,	  debt	  seems	  
to	  be	  preferred	  to	  equity
T he	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  firm's 	  
leverage	  deficit	  the	  effect	  of	  its 	  
leverage	  deficit	  on	  the	  payment	  
method	  in	  M&As
Managers 	  take	  deviatoins 	  from	  the	  target	  level	  into	  
account	  when	  planning	  acquis itions .	  F irms	  that	  are	  
overleveraged	  are	  less 	  likely	  to	  make	  acquis itions 	  
and	  are	  less 	  likely	  to	  use	  cash	  in	  their	  offers .	  
Acquire	  smaller	  targets 	  and	  pay	  lower	  premiums.
C redit	  ratings '	  and	  credit	  rating	  
level's 	  affect	  on	  payment	  method	  in	  
M&As
C redit	  rating	  level	  has 	  a	  pos itive	  impact	  on	  cash	  
payment,	  while	  the	  existence	  of	  credit	  rating	  do	  not	  
have	  any	  s ignificant	  impact	  on	  payment	  method
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2.4 Hypotheses 
Based on the previous literature we would like to examine following hypotheses. As argued 
above, a bidder holding a credit rating should have better access to public debt markets. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis will be investigated: 
 
H1: A firm that holds a credit rating is more likely to pay with cash in a merger or 
acquisition.  
 
Furthermore, bidders with better credit quality face relatively better opportunities to borrow, 
due to lower cost of debt and higher demand for their debt securities. Hence, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
 
H2: A firm that holds a higher level of credit rating is more likely to finance the 
acquisition with cash. 
 
However, these hypotheses do not consider whether a firm want to maximize its debt levels or 
not. A firm can have reached its target debt level and even though it holds a rating this may 
not explicitly explain the choice of payment method. Consequently it does not imply a 
positive relation between holding a credit rating and using cash as payment method in M&As. 
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3 Methodology 
In this chapter we are going to clarify the methodology and research approach that has been 
used in order to be able to answer the research questions proposed in the first chapter. 
Furthermore, the procedure of the obtained sample will be discussed. The relevant variables 
and the used econometric techniques will be presented in the end. 
 
3.1 Methodological Approach 
The methodological approach that will be employed in this study is based upon the 
methodologies from Faccio and Masulis (2005) and Karampatsas et al. (2014). The approach 
for the two studies is similar; the underlying theory is focused on the choice of payment 
method. The research from Faccio and Masulis (2005) is based on the European market and it 
will be employed for the definitions of variables that differ from Karampatsas et al (2014) 
study on the American market. Furthermore, Karampatsas et al. (2014) add the perspective of 
credit ratings, which will be investigated in our study with a similar approach. Consequently, 
the defined variables that are used in our thesis are supported by both studies. The foundation 
of this thesis is also based on the existing research discussed in the literature review and the 
presented theories from the previous chapter. 
 
The time period for the employed credit rating is four weeks prior to the acquisition 
announcement and has been applied as a measure of debt capacity and credit quality as in line 
with the study by Karampatsas et al. (2014). Since the purpose of this paper is to investigate 
the effects of credit rating on the choice of payment method, it is important that the data 
reflects the situation before the acquisition to get a more reliable result. Therefore, we believe 
that the time period will be enough to capture the desirable effect. 
 
3.1.1 Research Approach 
There are two main research approaches that can be applied to a study: deductive or inductive. 
The deductive approach use literature to identify theories that then will be tested using the 
data, in the inductive approach the researcher instead develop theories from the data which 
then is related to the theory (Saunders et al., 2009). In this paper the deductive approach will 
be employed since the underlying theory of credit ratings and payment methods in M&As by 
Karampatsas (2014) combined with Faccio and Masulis (2005) is tested. 
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Furthermore, in order to be able to answer our research questions we have used quantitative 
data. The approach of quantitative data is applied to understand and measure relevant 
variables so that the formulated hypotheses can be tested. Secondary data has the 
characteristics of being collected in another purpose and by someone else (Saunders et al., 
2009). In this paper we have used secondary data with the intention of developing our theories 
that are relevant, the employed sources are described in 3.2.1. The credit ratings from S&P 
are collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon, which is considered to be secondary data. 
Primary data on the other hand is where the data is collected from the original source, such as 
annual reports (Saunders et al., 2009). The credit ratings by Moody’s were gathered from 
their historical database, which is the primary source.  
 
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In order to apply the methodology from Karampatsas et al. (2014) and Faccio and Masulis 
(2005), we used several databases to generate a sample with specific characteristics. The same 
requirements and specifications have been applied as in Karampatsas et al. (2014) study. The 
database Zephyr was first used to generate all available acquisitions and mergers within 
Europe that was announced between 2000 and 2008, where the acquirer is publicly traded and 
the target is both private and public. The sample consists of both successful and unsuccessful 
deals. The time period of the sample is based on the sixth (and latest) wave of M&As in order 
to get the most representative sample, and the whole cycle is therefore taken into 
consideration. This resulted in a sample of 926 transactions. 
 
In order to get a representative sample for the European market, the countries with the largest 
contribution to Europe’s GDP in the chosen time period are collected from World DataBank. 
The eleven countries in our sample contributes to 90% of Europe’s total GDP, and the 
countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. These countries are considered to be the most 
representative of the European market.  
 
Both firms with and without credit rating will be included in the sample. Furthermore, all 
deals must have a value over €1 million to avoid noise in the analysis and the bidder must 
seek to acquire more than 50% in order to get transfer of control. The deals must be classified 
as merger, acquisition or acquisition of majority of assets to be included, thus other deals such 
as repurchases, liquidations, restructurings, divestitures, leveraged buyout, reverse takeover, 
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privatization, bankruptcy acquisition and going private are removed. The observations are 
also required to have transaction value and payment method information, which gave us an 
outcome of 448 transactions.  
 
In the next step in our selection procedure, nine firms was omitted due to default and that no 
information was available. Thereafter, the sample of 439 transactions was reduced even more 
due to that there were companies that had no financial data or were not found in the 
databases; Datastream, S&P Capital IQ and Thomson Reuters Eikon. We therefore had to 
exclude 161 observations. Finally, since we had many control variables to take into 
consideration, there were cases where key data for some of them could not be identified. Key 
data for 58 firms were missing and excluded from our sample. Thus, we got a final outcome 
of 220 observations.  
 
Figure 1. Sample Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The final sample consists of eleven countries, as previously mentioned, and the distribution 
among them is shown in the figure below. It consists of a majority of observations from 
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and Germany, which is reasonable since these countries 
have the highest contribution to Europe’s GDP. In Appendix 5, each countries contribution to 
GDP can be found.   
 
  
 
 
Default,	  9	  
No	  Data	  Available,	  161	  
Missing	  Key	  Data,	  58	  
Final	  Sample,	  220	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Figure 2. Distribution of Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The database used for collecting accounting data from annual reports is S&P Capital IQ. 
Furthermore, historical stock prices have been gathered from DataStream 5.0. Finally, 
information regarding deal features is collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
 
Credit rating information for the rated bidders is collected from both Moody’s and Thomson 
Reuters Eikon. The reason is that Moody’s did not rate all rated firms, therefore we 
complemented with the other database to obtain ratings from S&P. The credit rating 
information represents their long-term foreign issue. The reason that the long-term domestic 
rating is not employed, as in the study by Karampatsas et al. (2014), is because they only had 
one country to take into consideration. The fact that we have several countries in our sample 
makes the need of a more comparable measurement greater, which the long-term foreign 
rating represents. The range in our sample is between Aaa to C for Moody’s and between 
AAA to D for S&P’s, which will give a rating level ranging from 0 to 20. The rating scale 
employed in the study by Karampatsas et al. (2014) has a linear relationship and we have used 
the same in our study. Although, since we have credit ratings from two different CRAs we 
have used the linear transformation by Kräussl (2005), which is presented in the table below.  
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Table 2. Linear Transformation of Credit Ratings into Numerical Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Criticism of Data Sources 
The data that we have used is secondary, as mentioned in the two sections above, which could 
result in less reliable results. Since all of the collected data is from established databases that 
are commonly used by researchers as a source of information, it makes it more dependable. 
Also, since we have used the databases to complement each other with different data, it gives 
the sample higher validity because it is not only collected from one source. The credit ratings 
are collected from both primary and secondary sources. The optimum would have been to 
gather all of them from primary origin, but since access to S&P’s historical credit rating 
database was denied we had to complement with data from a secondary source; Thomson 
Reuters Eikon. The ratings gathered from Moody’s were compared to the ones in Thomas 
Reuters Eikon and there were no deviations from the original ones. Therefore, we consider the 
data to be reliable since it is a well-established database, and we do not believe that this would 
have affected our results significantly.  
 
Numerical	  scores S &P Moody's
20 AAA Aaa
19 AA+ Aa1
18 AA Aa2
17 AA-­‐ Aa3
16 A+ A1
15 A A2
14 A-­‐ A3
13 BB B+ Baa1
12 BB B Baa2
11 BB B-­‐ Baa3
10 BB + Ba1
9 BB Ba2	  
8 BB -­‐ Ba3
7 B+ B1
6 B B2
5 B-­‐ B3
4 C C C + C aa1
3 C C C C aa2	  
2 C C C -­‐ C aa3
1 C C C a
0 D C
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3.3 Econometric Techniques 
The data in our sample is cross-sectional, which is the type of data where the variables are 
collected at a single point in time (Brooks, 2008). In our thesis we collected a sample of 
M&As, reflecting 220 observations, in the time period between the years 2000 to 2008.  
 
In order to be able to investigate the two hypotheses mentioned in the previous chapter two 
different regression techniques will be used. The dependent variable method of payment is a 
dummy variable and the choice of payment will be investigated using a probit regression. 
This model estimates the probability of ending up with either of the two outcomes, to pay 
with cash or stock. The variable fraction of cash lies in the interval between 0 and 1, hence a 
Generalized Linear Model (GLM) logit regression is used instead. The logit model is one of 
the most commonly used dummy variable regression model and it is based on the cumulative 
logistic probability distribution, which is defined as the following: 
 
 
 
The GLM logit model have fitted values of F(zi) that are bounded within the interval [0,1] 
and most often give similar characterisation of the data (Brooks, 2008). Furthermore, the idea 
with the model is to fit the parameters so that the predicted values for F(zi) match the actual 
observed values of the dependent dummy variable as closely as possible for every existing 
observation. Finally, the model is non-linear, hence, a one unit increase in one of our 
regressors does not result in the same change in F(zi).  
 
The probit model is most often used as an alternative to the logit model. The only difference 
between the two is that the probit is instead based on the cumulative normal distribution and 
is defined as the following: 
 
 
 
Since one of our dependent variable payment method takes a value of 0 or 1, the probit model 
is the most appropriate one for those regressions. The other dependent variable fraction of 
cash instead takes a value between 0 and 1, which makes the GLM logit model a better fit. 
Finally, EViews will be used for the implementation. 
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3.4 Regressions 
In order to answer our research questions we tested our two hypotheses with two different 
samples; a total sample of rated and unrated firms and a sample with only firms holding a 
credit rating, following the methodology of Karampatsas et al. (2014). Every sample was 
tested with two different models, probit and GLM logit, since we have the two different 
dependent variables: payment method and fraction of cash. This resulted in a total of four 
regressions. 
 
The following regressions are defined: 
1. Prob(payment_method=1) = F(a + ß1credit_rating + ß2lnsize + ß3leverage + 
ß4collateral + ß5book_to_market + ß6runup + ß7cash_flow_to_assets + 
ß8number_of_analysts + ß9relative_size + ß10diversifying_deals + ß11private + u) 
 2. fraction_of_cash = a + ß1credit_rating + ß2lnsize + ß3leverage + ß4collateral + 
ß5book_to_market + ß6runup + ß7cash_flow_to_assets + ß8number_of_analysts + 
ß9relative_size + ß10diversifying_deals + ß11private + ℇ  
 
The two above equations aim to understand if the existence of a credit rating affects the 
payment method or fraction of cash used in M&As. Here, the whole sample is used as a base 
in order to see whether rated firms are more likely to pay with cash.  
 
3. Prob(payment_method=1) = F(a + ß1credit_rating_level + ß2lnsize + ß3leverage + 
ß4collateral + ß5book_to_market + ß6runup + ß7cash_flow_to_assets + 
ß8number_of_analysts + ß9relative_size + ß10diversifying_deals + ß11private + u) 
 4. fraction_of_cash = a + ß1redit_rating_level + ß2lnsize + ß3leverage + ß4collateral 
+ ß5book_to_market + ß6runup + ß7cash_flow_to_assets + ß8number_of_analysts + 
ß9relative_size + ß10diversifying_deals + ß11private + ℇ  
 
These equations are based on the sample of only rated firms, where the aim is to see if the 
credit rating level of a firm has any affect on the payment method or the fraction of cash used 
as a financing source. 
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3.4.1 Regression Assumptions 
In situations where the dummy variable is the explanatory variable, the most appropriate 
model to use is either the GLM logit or the probit model as have been mentioned above. 
However, in order for the models to be reliable there are a number of assumptions that must 
be fulfilled. Similar to other varieties of multiple regressions, both of the models are sensitive 
to extremely high correlation among the independent variables, which could lead to 
multicollinearity. The outcome of the problem is most often extremely large standard errors 
for parameter estimates (Fidell and Tabachnick, 2007). In order to control for 
multicollinearity a correlation test has been performed in EViews, which can be viewed in 
Appendix 1. Multicollinearity exists in a sample if the correlation between two variables is 
higher than 0,80 (Brooks, 2008). As can be examined by the table in the appendix, none of the 
variables have higher correlation than 0,80. Hence, there is no problem of multicollinearity in 
our sample. Another assumption that must be taken into consideration is the existence of 
outliers, which can result in that the model has poor fit. The outliers of a sample can be found 
by examination of the residuals (Fidell and Tabachnick, 2007). In our sample we had no 
extreme outliers, which meant that we did not need to remove any of our observations. 
Finally, a last assumption is that the sample needs to be quite large in relation to the number 
of independent variables in order to get a good fit for the models. This could lead to that they 
produce extremely large parameters and standard errors (ibid.). Since our sample does not 
show any of the mentioned problems, there are no indications that it needs to be controlled for 
even though we do not have that large of a sample. Although, the outcome of the result could 
have been different and more representative if the sample would have been greater since it is 
not that large in comparison to Karampatsas et al. (2014). 
 
3.5 Variables  
3.5.1 Dependent Variables 
A regression tries to explain a relationship between the dependent and explanatory 
variable(s), whereas the dependent variable depends on one or a number of explanatory 
variables (Brooks, 2008). The purpose of this paper is to investigate if credit ratings affect the 
choice of payment method in M&As. As in the study by Karampatsas et al. (2014) two 
dependent variables will be used to investigate the relationship; payment method and fraction 
of cash. These two dependent variables may possibly be explained by a firm’s credit rating. 
The definition of payment method is whether the offer contains more or less than 50% cash as 
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part of the total offer by the bidder to the target shareholders. In the probit regression, 
payment method is a dummy variable, which takes on a value of 1 for deals financed with 
more than 50% cash; and 0 otherwise. In the GLM logit regression, fraction of cash lies in the 
interval 0 and 1. 
 
3.5.2 Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variable(s) in a regression tries to explain the behaviour of the dependent 
variable. The regression tries to explain movements in the dependent variable by movements 
in the explanatory variable(s). The explanatory variable(s) does not depend on any other 
variable and is also called the independent variable (Brooks, 2008). In this study, we suggest 
that the payment method is partly explained by credit ratings, and to be able to explain this 
relationship, credit rating and level of credit rating are included as explanatory variables. 
These variables are presented below and are the same explanatory variables that have been 
used by Karampatsas et al. (2014).  
 
Through our hypothesis we want to investigate if bidders holding a credit rating are more 
likely to pay with cash, since they should have better access to public debt markets. Hence, 
the sample will be divided into two groups, with or without credit rating assigned by Moody’s 
and S&P. We call this variable credit rating, which is a dummy variable that takes on value 1 
for rated firms, and 0 for unrated firms. 
 
In this paper the hypothesis also suggest that a firms with higher credit rating level should be 
able to borrow at a lower cost and face a higher demand for their debt securities, which will 
affect the choice of payment method. Our sample contains a rating range between Aaa/AAA-
C/D from Moody’s and S&P, which is translated to a range of number from 0 to 20, where 
Aaa/AAA level takes 20 and C/D takes 0. This variable is called credit rating level and is a 
continuous variable for rated bidders.  
 
3.5.3 Control Variables 
Previous studies have shown that there are many possible determinants of the choice of 
payment in M&As. To show that the decision of payment method clearly depends on credit 
rating, a number of control variables are introduced to the regression. A control variable 
control for other factors that may have an impact on the dependent variable and its 
relationship to the explanatory variable(s) (Brooks, 2008).  
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Faccio and Masulis (2005) investigated whether a firm’s debt capacity has an impact on the 
choice of payment method in M&As. As a proxy for debt capacity they use the variable 
collateral, since a firm’s ratio of tangible assets has a strong positive impact on its possible 
debt level (Hovakimian et al., 2001). Bidders that offer a majority of cash also have a higher 
percentage of collateral than bidders that pay with a majority of stocks, which is found that 
have a positive impact by Faccio and Masulis (2005). Nevertheless, Karampatsas et al. (2014) 
did not find it significant. The variable collateral is measured as the ratio of property, plant 
and equipment (PPE) to the book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year prior to the 
acquisition announcement. Another variable that also affect the bidder’s debt capacity is size. 
Karampatsas et al. (2014) argue that larger firms are more diversified, which leads to a lower 
probability of default, and hence, the possibility to take on more debt. The variable size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization 4 weeks prior announcement of 
the deal. Already existing debt can decrease a firm’s financial flexibility and make it difficult 
to issue more debt. Therefore, the financial condition of the firm may reduce the ability to 
take on debt; hence a stock offer is more likely. To measure firms’ financial condition, the 
variable leverage is introduced to the model. Faccio and Masulis (2005) found this variable to 
have a significant impact on the payment method, firms with significant amount of debt prefer 
to finance the acquisition with stock. On the other hand, Harford et al. (2009) and 
Karampatsas et al. (2014) found a positive relationship between leverage and cash payment. 
They argue that firms prone to pay with equity usually have greater growth opportunities and 
less leverage. Leverage is measured as the ratio of a firm’s total debt to the book value of 
assets in the end of the fiscal year prior acquisition announcement. 
 
Growth opportunities can affect a firm’s payment method in an acquisition. La Bruslerie 
(2013) found those firms with high growth potential and a high stock value are more prone to 
pay with cash. On the other hand, Martin (1996) and Karampatsas et al. (2014) found a 
positive relation between book-to-market and cash payment. Firms with higher growth 
opportunities prefer to pay with stock. The bidder’s book-to-market value is used as a proxy 
for growth opportunities, and is measured as the ratio of the book value of equity at the fiscal 
year-end prior to the deal announcement to the market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the 
acquisition announcement. Furthermore, when the stock is overvalued it is more likely that 
the bidder will pay with equity (Rhodes-Kopf and Viswanathan, 2004; Chemmanur et al., 
2009), and to measure bidder’s overvaluation the variable run-up is used. This variable is 
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measured as the bidder market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns over the period (-205, -6) days 
prior announcement. Karampatsas et al. (2014) found this variable highly significant on a 
firm’s choice of payment method. 
 
The variable number of analysts is introduced to control for information asymmetry in the 
market. Information asymmetries can result in that bidders try to pay with overvalued stock 
and it is less likely that target accepts this if the real value of the bidder’s stock is unknown. A 
higher number of analysts that monitor the firm result in less information asymmetry as 
argued by Chemmanur et al. (2009) and supported by Karampatsas et al (2014). 
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) found that private targets are more likely to accept cash, since their 
need for liquidity is greater. Target’s status is therefore included, and Karampatsas et al. 
(2014) found this variable to be highly significant and have a positive impact on the payment 
method. The variable private is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for private targets, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
The Pecking Order theory states that firms should first of all use internal cash to finance 
investment (Myers, 1984), but it also increases the likelihood that the managers engage in 
empire-building activities (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, as in line with Karampatsas et al. (2014), 
a positive relationship is expected between cash flow and probability of a cash offer. The 
variable cash flow to assets is measured as the ratio of EBIT excl. unusual items plus 
depreciation minus total dividend divided by the total asset in the end of the fiscal year before 
the acquisition announcement. 
 
The larger target relative to the bidder, the higher likelihood of paying with equity, since it is 
difficult to raise a relatively large amount of cash (Harford et al., 2009). The variable relative 
size is a ratio of the transaction value to the bidder’s market value 4 weeks prior acquisition 
announcement. 
 
Finally, the variable diversifying deals is introduced to our model. Faccio and Masulis (2005) 
argued that the target is reluctant to accept a stock offer, since it has little knowledge about 
the bidder’s industry and business risk, and hence the true value of the firm. However, 
Karampatsas et al. (2014) did not find the variable to be significant. The variable diversifying 
deals is defined as a dummy, which takes on the value 1 for inter-industry transactions, and 0 
otherwise. Industry relatedness is determined through the UK 3-digit SIC level.   
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3.5.4 Excluded Variables 
Karampatsas et al. (2014) argued for a number of additional variables that should be used to 
control for market credit condition, competition, monitoring, hostility and mode of 
acquisition. However, we have chosen to exclude these variables for various reasons. The 
variables interest rate spread and competition are not significant in the research on the US 
market and due to lack of data we find it reasonable to exclude these variables from our 
dataset. In our sample, all deals are friendly and therefore the variable hostile is also excluded. 
Even though the variables tender and blockholder ownership were significant in the study by 
Karampatsas et al. (2014) they are excluded because of missing data.  
 
3.6 Endogeneity 
One of the most important issues that many studies are confronted by is the problem of 
endogeneity. It is defined as a correlation between the explanatory variables and the error 
term in the regression. The outcome could lead to biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates, which makes it almost impossible to make reliable inference (Roberts and Whited, 
2013). Even though there are available techniques to mitigate the problem of endogeneity, the 
error term is unobservable and therefore one can never be sure that it has been completely 
solved. There are two main different causes of endogeneity in our sample; omitted variables 
and selection bias. Omitted variables is when an explanatory variable is excluded although it 
should not have been, which ends up in the error term. If the part of the error term that 
includes the omitted variable is correlated with any of the independent variables, endogeneity 
is a problem (Roberts and Whited, 2013). The selection bias refers to the non-random 
assignment to different groups, which means that firms might make a choice on factors that 
are observable or unobservable (ibid.). In our collected sample, the credit rating variables 
have been treated as exogenous. This implies that the decision to obtain a credit rating and the 
level of credit ratings is randomly allocated across the sample. However, as argued by 
Karampatsas et al. (2014), due to the fact that firms can partially determine if they want to 
obtain a credit rating or if they want to have higher rating level it is quite likely that the 
decision to obtain a credit rating is based on firm specific characteristics that are not 
accounted for. Therefore, there is a need to control for the problem in order to be able to 
mitigate the outcome of biased and inconsistent estimation of the parameters.  
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3.6.1 Instrumental Variables 
To get rid of the part that causes the endogeneity problem, instrumental variables (IVs) can be 
used in the model. An IV needs to fulfil two criteria. First, it needs to be correlated with the 
endogenous variable, in our case credit rating and level of credit rating. Second, it has to be 
uncorrelated with the error term. Although, this is difficult to test since the error term is 
unobservable. However, if the IV is partly correlated with the dependent variable it is likely to 
be correlated with the error term as well. Hence, an IV that fulfils these criteria can only 
affect the dependent variable through the endogenous variable. (Roberts and Whited, 2013) 
 
In this study we have chosen IVs from the methodology used by Karampatsas et al. (2014) 
since we believe that they are also applicable to our study. The first variable regulated 
industry is included in the regression on both credit rating and level of credit rating. Firms in 
regulated industries rely more on public debt than other firms, since they face lower agency 
costs and do not have any needs for monitoring. Thus, these firms reveal their cost of capital 
which is beneficial to obtain a rating as argued by Karampatsas et al. (2014). The variable is a 
dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm is a financial institution or a utility firm, 
and 0 otherwise. The specification of the firm’s industry is based on the firm’s three digit 
SIC-codes as by Faccio and Masulis (2005). 
 
In the endogeneity control for credit rating, an additional variable is added, industry fraction. 
Firms in well-established industries are more likely to get a credit rating when they issue a 
bond (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). Investors are already familiar with the industry and 
banks save cost in order to underwrite the bond issue (ibid). To get the variable and control 
for this effect, the fraction of firms with credit rating in the same industry is added to the log 
of 1. The industry is once again based on the SIC-code. To control for endogeneity problem 
for level of credit rating, the variable industry level is used instead. This is the median level of 
credit rating in the fiscal year prior the acquisition for each industry group. 
 
3.6.2 Methodology for Endogeneity Control 
The test for controlling for endogeneity has been conducted manually in EViews with the 
Hausman test as described in Brooks (2008). Since we worry that credit rating and credit 
rating level is not completely exogenous; what we mean when we assume and say that they 
are endogenous is that there are some other variables that influence the two of them. Hence, 
there are equations that explain credit rating and credit rating level. The first step in the 
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Hausman test is to obtain the reduced form equations; writing the endogenous variables as a 
function of the other variables. The two equations, with the included IVs, are defined as the 
following: 
 
1. credit_rating = ß0 + ß1lnsize + ß2leverage + ß3collateral + 
ß4book_to_market + ß5runup + ß6cash_flow_to_assets + 
ß7number_of_analysts + ß8relative_size + ß9diversifying_deals + ß10private 
+ß11industry_fraction + ß12regulated_industry + u 
 
2. credit_rating_level = ß0 + ß1lnsize + ß2leverage + ß3collateral + 
ß4book_to_market + ß5runup + ß6cash_flow_to_assets + 
ß7number_of_analysts + ß8relative_size + ß9diversifying_deals + ß10private 
+ß11industry_level + ß12regulated_industry + u 
 
Thereafter, the fitted values of credit_rating and credit_rating_level are obtained. These 
values are then introduced to the equations of interest, equations 1-2 and 3-4. In Appendix 2 
the output of the Hausman test can be viewed. 
 
3.6.3 Further Robustness Tests 
In Karampatsas et al. (2014), they have conducted another robustness test, in addition to the 
endogeneity control, in order to check that the model can handle variability and still remain 
effective. The robustness tests for unused debt capacity have not been carried out in our study 
due to the lack of data. Since our sample consists of too few target firms that holds a rating 
due to that most if them are private, it was not possible to go through with the test.   
 
3.7 Validity 
Validity refers to that the used data should both relevant and valid. Hence, if the method that 
has been used measures what it is supposed to measure (Saunders et al., 2009). There are two 
types of validity, external and internal. The external validity is to what extent that the results 
of the study are generalizable, if they can be applied to similar studies or settings. In order for 
that to be possible it means that the research study has to be representative for the area that it 
should be applied to. The internal validity instead refers to whether there exists a causal 
relationship between the measured variables (ibid.). 
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The external validity of this study can be referred to whether the countries in the sample are 
representative of the European market or not. Since we have taken the top countries 
representing 90% of the total GDP of Europe, we believe that the chosen countries represent 
Europe well and the validity has been strengthen to some extent. Although, it might still be 
difficult to generalize the results since the laws and regulations among the different countries 
differ, but also their access to debt and equity capital. Therefore, this must be considered in 
order to be able to generalise the results. Including control variables in order to control for 
firm-specific factors has strengthened the internal validity. Furthermore, since we have used 
long-term credit ratings in the study, the effects of business or credit cycles have been 
mitigated.  
 
3.8 Reliability 
Reliability is defined as to what extent the data collection techniques and analysis procedure 
will result in consistent findings (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
The credit ratings that we have employed have been collected from Moody’s but also from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon. Moody’s is one of the three biggest CRAs and either they or S&P 
have rated most rated companies. Therefore we see the source as a reliable and accurate for 
historical credit ratings. However, due the restricted user profile that we received from 
Moody’s (a free trial) there were credit ratings that we could not access. Hence, we needed to 
complement the data with credit ratings from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database. Since the 
database is widely used by researchers, it is considered reliable. For the collection of financial 
data for the companies, S&P’s Capital IQ was employed. The data from there has been 
derived from annual reports from the companies, which means that it has been approved 
before. Thus, the reliability of the data is considered to be quite high. Finally, data regarding 
stock prices were collected from Datastream. This database is also well used by researchers, 
which gives the collected data higher reliability.  
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4 Empirical Results 
In this chapter we will first present the descriptive statistics of our study, which will give an 
understanding of the sample we have collected. Thereafter, the results of the regressions will be 
shown both with tables and with interpretational text. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
To get an overview of the sample, the data is summarized and presented in the tables below. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics – Payment Method 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistic for our total sample and for the two different 
alternatives of payment method. In our sample of 220 observations, 175 of them pay with a 
majority of cash and 45 pay with a majority of stock. The fraction of firms with credit rating 
is 35,5% for both groups. The mean size of the firms that paid with cash is €6937,24 million, 
which is larger than for firms that pay with stock (€5547,40 million). Cash-dominated deals 
have also higher mean and median leverage, collateral, book-to-market value, and cash-flow-
to-assets than stock-dominated deals. Furthermore, they also have on average a higher number 
of analysts that monitor the firm. Stock-dominated deals have higher mean run-up and relative 
size, but also include more non-diversifying deals. 
 
Firms that are involved in stock-dominated deals are on average smaller but the size of the 
deal is on average larger relative to the bidders own value than for firms that pay with cash. 
Firms that pay with cash are on average larger, have more leverage, collateral, which 
indicates that these firms are more mature companies and have on average higher cash-flow 
Total	  sample (1)	  C ash	  >	  50% (2)	  C ash	  <	  50%
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
N 220 175 45
% 	  credit	  rating 35,45% 35,43% 35,56%
S ize	  (€	  million) 6652,95600 613,01600 6937,24300 648,81700 4457,39700 420,00000
L everage 0,61430 0,63102 0,62705 0,64591 0,56409 0,53126
C ollateral 0,22885 0,15557 0,23344 0,16358 0,21104 0,11366
Book-­‐to-­‐market 0,57352 0,38853 0,60438 0,39954 0,45352 0,04994
R un-­‐up 0,07827 0,05828 0,06899 0,06122 0,11436 0,04286
C ash	  flows	  to	  assets 0,05580 0,04738 0,05743 0,05079 0,04944 0,04058
Number	  of	  analysts 15,39545 11,00000 15,88000 11,00000 13,51111 6,00000
% 	  Divers ifying	  deals 0,43636 -­‐ 0,41714 -­‐ 0,51111 -­‐
R elative	  s ize 155,73740 43,11013 137,86180 38,66094 225,25360 57,74747
% 	  P rivate 0,790909 -­‐ 0,81143 -­‐ 0,71111 -­‐
	   35	  
and lower growth opportunities. It also indicates that firms involved in cash-dominated deals 
are smaller, younger firms with higher growth opportunities. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics – Credit Rating 
 
Table 4 shows the sample divided into groups with credit rating and without. In our sample 
there are 78 observations with credit rating and 142 unrated observations. The sample with 
credit rating contains significantly larger firms (€17220,02 million) than the sample without 
credit rating (€848,02 million). We can also see that firms with credit rating have on average 
more leverage and collateral than other firms. Furthermore, book-to-market, number of 
analysts, relative size is also higher for rated compared to unrated firms. The group with rated 
firms have a negative run-up while the group with unrated firms have a positive coefficient 
for this variable. Firms with credit rating have a lower cash flow to assets than firms without 
credit rating. The total sample contains mostly private targets, but the fraction of private 
targets is slightly higher for the group without credit rating. 
 
Firms with credit rating are much larger than firms without rating; even the median for rated 
firms is greater. The characteristics are on average similar as for firms that pay with cash and 
firms in this group are likely to be mature companies. Furthermore, their book-to-market 
value are higher than for unrated firms, which indicates higher growth opportunities for firms 
without rating. 
 
The result from the descriptive statistics indicate that firms involved in cash-dominated deals 
are mature firms with a steady cash flow, while firms involved in stock-dominated deals have 
larger growth opportunities and lower cash flow. Characteristics of firms in cash-deals are 
Total	  sample With	  credit	  rating	  (1) Without	  credit	  rating	  (2)
Mean	   Median Mean Median Mean Median
N 220 78 142
S ize	  (€	  million) 6652,95600 613,01600 17220,02000 8090,99400 848,01940 253,23600
Leverage 0,61430 0,63102 0,67489 0,68712 0,58102 0,58453
C ollateral 0,22885 0,15557 0,28776 0,25476 0,19650 0,12215
Book-­‐to-­‐market 0,57352 0,38853 0,67049 0,41849 0,52025 0,37643
R un-­‐up 0,07827 0,05828 -­‐0,02458 -­‐0,00559 0,13477 0,09141
C ash	  flows	  to	  assets 0,05580 0,04738 0,05325 0,03698 0,05719 0,05529
Number	  of	  analysts 15,39545 11,00000 29,23077 29,00000 7,79578 5,00000
% 	  Divers ifying	  deals 0,43636 -­‐ 0,46154 -­‐ 0,42254 -­‐
R elative	  s ize 155,73740 43,11013 214,33150 22,37671 123,55190 53,55535
% 	  P rivate 0,790909 -­‐ 0,53846 -­‐ 0,92958 -­‐
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similar to the ones for firm with credit rating, although it is not possible to draw any 
conclusion from the descriptive statistics; instead the regressions will show how and to what 
extent each variable influence the choice of payment method. 
 
4.2 Regression Results 
In order to test our hypotheses, four different regressions were performed. The results are the 
following: 
 
Table 5. Credit Rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table above reports the coefficients, standard errors within parenthesis and p-values. * p= 1%,  
** p= 5% and  *** p= 10%.  
 
The two first regressions investigate the relationship between the existence of credit rating 
and payment method from Equation 1 and 2. Unfortunately, the GLM logit model has no 
significant variables, but leverage and book-to-market influence payment method more than 
the other variable since they have the lowest p-value. This is consistent with the result in the 
probit model. 
 
The probit model shows that our main variable of interest credit rating is significant on 5% 
level and has a negative impact on payment method, which implies that firms with credit 
rating are more likely to pay with stock. However, credit rating is not the most explanatory 
N=220 GLM	  L ogit	  (1) P robit	  (2)
C oefficient P -­‐value C oefficient P -­‐value
C onstant 0,2098 0,0086
C redit	  rating 0,4548 0,0325
Ln(s ize) 0,4508 0,079
L everage 0,157 0,001
C ollateral	   0,9723 0,8273
Book-­‐to-­‐market 0,2468 0,0049
R un-­‐up 0,6418 0,6076
C ash	  flows	  to	  assets 0,4684 0,0759
Number	  of	  analys ts 0,8638 0,7312
R elative	  s ize 0,4267 0,0815
Divers ifying	  deals 0,4553 0,3355
Private 0,5795 0,1176
Pseudo	  R -­‐square 0,773491 0,123889
-­‐4,939317	  
(3,938916)
-­‐2,807970***	  
(1,067944)
-­‐1,199313	  
(1,604745)
-­‐0,830617**	  
(0,388434)
0,386573	  
(0,512663)
0,261132*	  
(0,148685)
4,623742	  
(3,267335)
2,261684***	  
0,688778)
0,065754	  
(1,890781)
0,106236	  
(0,486977)
2,223835	  
(1,920092)
0,940497***	  
(0,224568)
0,598170	  
(1,285774)
-­‐0,144283	  
(0,281017)
5,156156	  
(7,111413)	  
3,966578*	  
(2,234704)
-­‐0,009451	  
(0,055110)
-­‐0,006268	  
(0,018250)
-­‐0,000839	  
(0,001056)
-­‐0,000526*	  
(0,000302)
-­‐0,587710	  
(0,787206)
-­‐0,215522	  
(0,223783)
0,575257	  
(1,038212)
0,500270	  
(0,319692)
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variable. Leverage and book-to-market are significant on 1% level and have the largest 
influence on payment method. Both of them have positive coefficients, which indicates that 
firms with more leverage and lower growth opportunities are more likely to pay with cash. 
Furthermore, size, cash flows to assets and relative size are significant on 10% level. Size and 
cash flows to assets positively influence the payment method, which means that larger firms 
and firms with higher cash flows are more prone to pay with cash. The result implies that 
these firms have more money to spend and would prefer to use cash to finance investments. 
Relative size has a negative sign, which indicates that the larger the deal size is in relation to 
the bidders own value the less likely the firm is to pay with cash. 
Table 6. Level of Credit Rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table above reports the coefficients, standard errors within parenthesis and p-values. * p= 1%,  
** p= 5% and  *** p= 10%.  
 
The regressions in Equation 3 and 4 investigate the relationship between level of credit rating 
and payment method, among rated firms. The GLM logit model is also here insignificant, 
while the probit model show some significant variables. Although, level of credit rating is not 
significant, which indicates that the associated benefits or costs of a certain credit rating do 
not explicitly influence the choice of payment method, and it may be other circumstances that 
influence if a firm choose to finance its investment with cash or stock. Book-to-market and 
runup are the most influential variables on payment method among rated firms, both 
N=78 GLM	  L ogit	  (1)
C onstant 0,7231 0,1629
0,8347 0,4636
0,8473 0,6172
0,9713 0,1729
0,871 0,5111
0,5709 0,0274
0,4835 0,0476
0,9179 0,3056
0,9082 0,6938
0,8298 0,0566
0,9737 0,5819
Private 0,7075 0,1994
0,779459 0,177704
Probit	  (2)
C oefficient P -­‐value C oefficient P -­‐value
-­‐0,690003	  
(1,947730)
-­‐4,516829	  
(3.237279)
L evel	  of	  credit	  rating
-­‐0,012161	  
(0,058278)
0,056401	  
(0,076953)
L n(s ize)
0,041081	  
(0,213308)
0,152285	  
(0,304719)
L everage
0,031661	  
(0,879523)
2,11373	  
(1.550979)
C ollateral	  
-­‐0,107022	  
(0,659001)
-­‐0,552638	  
(0,840973)
Book-­‐to-­‐market
0,131895	  
(0,232710)
1,972477**	  
(0,894088)
R un-­‐up
-­‐0,361183	  
(0,515491)
-­‐1,526626**	  
(0,770616)
C ash	  flows	  to	  assets
0,296905	  
(2,880114)
5,422649	  
(5,292734)
Number	  of	  analys ts
0,002427	  
(0,021042)
0,012554	  
(0,031880)
R elative	  s ize
-­‐6,750005	  
(0,000314)
-­‐0,000918	  
(0,000482)
Divers ifying	  deals
0,010286	  
(0,010286)
0,23906	  
(0,434189)
0,140793	  
(0,275204)
0,678493	  
(0,528708)
Pseudo	  R -­‐square
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significant at 5% level. Book-to-market has a positive impact on payment method, which 
implies the same explanation as mentioned above for the total sample. Run-up has a negative 
impact on payment method, which indicates that when a firm’s stock price increases in the 
period before announcement the firm is more likely to pay with stock. Relative size is 
significant at 10% level and the same holds as for the previous regression, the larger deal 
value the more likely is the firm to pay with stock. 
 
The results from the two groups are slightly different, which may be due to the different 
characteristics of rated and unrated firms. For our main variables of interest, credit rating and 
level of credit rating, we find that credit rating significantly influence the choice of payment 
method, while level of credit rating does not. For both groups, book-to-market has the highest 
influence on the choice of payment method. The variable leverage is highly significant in the 
total sample but not for the rated group, which indicates that level of debt has a greater 
influence for unrated firms. For rated firms, the run-up has a significant impact, so when the 
stock price increases in the period before the announcement firms want to pay with stock. 
 
The pseudo R-squares for the two GLM logit have high values; the regression on credit rating 
had a pseudo R-square of 77,4% and on credit rating level 77,9%, which suggest that the 
models have quite a good fit. The probit models had pseudo R-squares that were significantly 
lower, the regression on credit rating had a pseudo R-square of 12,4% and on credit rating 
level 17,8%, which indicates that the model does not explain the dependent variable that well. 
Although, pseudo R-square is not the real R-square it still gives some indications whether the 
model has good fit or not. The pseudo R-squares for the probit models are very low, although 
it is a small but reliable relationship, since many of the variables are significant. Even though 
the GLM logit models has higher pseudo R-squares and explains the dependent variable well, 
no reliable relationships can be found. 
 
4.3 Endogeneity Control 
To investigate a potential endogeneity problem, we performed two Hausman tests with our 
chosen IVs, which can be found in Appendix 2. Regulated industry was not significant but 
industry fraction and industry level was highly significant at 1% level. Both of them have a 
positive coefficient as expected. One of the tests also showed significance for the fitted value 
of credit rating, which supported our prediction that the variable credit rating is endogenous. 
The other variable, credit rating level, did not show any signs of endogeneity. Credit rating is 
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argued to be endogenous, as mentioned before, due to selection bias. However, it is more 
difficult to choose level of rating even though, as mentioned, in chapter 2 firms can to some 
extent influence. Therefore, we choose to control for endogeneity for this variable as well in 
order to see whether we could get a model with better fit. To control for the problem, a two 
stage least square (2SLS) regression was performed to get a better outcome with the following 
result below.  
 
Table 7. Endogeneity Control – Credit Rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table above reports the coefficients, standard errors within parenthesis and p-values. * p= 1%,  
** p= 5% and  *** p= 10%.  
 
Credit rating is still significant, but now at 1% level. The coefficient is also here negative but 
not as much as in the previous regression. The implication is the same; rated firms are more 
likely to pay with stock. Leverage and book-to-market are, as in the previous regression, 
significant at 1% level and are together with credit rating the most explanatory variable. 
Furthermore, size is also significant, but now at 5% level. After controlling for endogeneity, 
larger firms with lower growth opportunities are still more likely to pay with cash, while firms 
with low leverage are more likely to pay with stock. When we control for endogeneity in the 
regression on the dependent variable fraction of cash, private is also significant, at 10% level, 
which indicates that firms that acquire private targets are more likely to pay with cash. 
N=220 F raction	  of	  cash Payment	  method
C oefficient P -­‐value C oefficient P -­‐value
C onstant 0,4837 0,4492
C redit	  rating 0,0019 0,0074
Ln(s ize) 0,0145 0,0224
L everage 0,0006 0,0013
C ollateral	   0,2553 0,4607
Book-­‐to-­‐market 0,0014 0,0034
R un-­‐up 0,7295 0,5575
C ash	  flows	  to	  assets 0,4399 0,1794
Number	  of	  analysts 0,8087 0,9013
R elative	  s ize 0,6108 0,2838
Divers ifying	  deals 0,2527 -­‐0,043109 0,4539
Private 0,0917 0,1816
F -­‐statis tic 3,024272 0,0009 2,48307 0,0060
R -­‐square 0,091897 0,085514
Adjusted	  R -­‐square 0,043872 0,037152
-­‐0,160260	  
(0,228415)
-­‐0,0202962	  
(0,267696)
-­‐0,370580***	  
(0,117742)
-­‐0,372978***	  
(0,137990)
0,080719**	  
(0,032753)
0,088336**	  
(0,38386)
0,486339***	  
(0,139677)
0,532232***	  
(0,163697)
0,122866	  
(0,107700)
0,093275	  
(0,126221)
0,143938***	  
(0,044592)
0,155008***	  
(0,052261)
-­‐0,023305	  
(0,067297)
-­‐0,046332	  
(0,078870)
0,357622	  
(0,462119)
0,729665	  
(0,541590)
0,000957	  
(0,003950)
-­‐0,000575	  
(0,004629)
-­‐3,640005	  
(7,14005)
-­‐9,000005	  
(0,057455)
-­‐0,05623	  
(0,049025)
0,125785*	  
(0,074239)
0,116622	  
(0,087006)
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However, private is not significant in the regression with payment method as the dependent 
variable.  
 
Table 8. Endogeneity Control – Credit Rating Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table above reports the coefficients, standard errors within parenthesis and p-values. * p= 1%,  
** p= 5% and  *** p= 10%.  
 
After controlling for endogeneity in the variable level of credit rating, none of the variables 
are significant. This is probably because level of credit rating was exogenous already from the 
beginning, hence the 2SLS model gave a worse fit than the chosen model used initially. 
Although, book-to-market and run-up are still the most influential variables on payment 
method even though they are not significant. 
 
It is clear that the 2SLS model did not give a better fit for level of credit rating, hence the 
originally model will be the one employed for our analysis. For credit rating the 2SLS gave 
somewhat higher significance for credit rating, size and private. However, the variables did not 
change that much and R-square was lower than the initial models, which makes us chose them for 
the analysis. The F-statistics were also only significant for credit rating, which suggests that there 
is a relationship between payment method and one or several of the independent variables. For 
credit rating level, where the F-statistics were not significant, this could imply that none of the 
N=78 F raction	  of	  cash Payment	  method
C oefficient P -­‐value C oefficient P -­‐value
C onstant 0,5293 -­‐0,5316
C redit	  rating	  level 0,6123 -­‐0,7063
Ln(s ize) 0,6103 -­‐0,7200
L everage 0,8672 -­‐0,6419
C ollateral	   0,6998 -­‐0,6463
Book-­‐to-­‐market 0,1435 -­‐0,1678
R un-­‐up -­‐0,1003 -­‐0,1014
C ash	  flows	  to	  assets 0,7698 0,8086
Number	  of	  analysts 0,7877 -­‐0,7686
R elative	  s ize 0,5550 -­‐0,2873
Divers ifying	  deals 0,9038 0,8513
Private 0,3415 0,5328
F -­‐statis tic 0,751488 0,6857 0,715698 0,7194
R -­‐square 0,110248 0,104795
Adjusted	  R -­‐square -­‐0,038044 -­‐0,044405
0,400287	  
(0,632954)
0,423142	  
(0,672656)
-­‐0,10741	  
(0,021091)
-­‐0,008484	  
(0,022414)
0,035262	  
(0,068863)
0,02635	  
(0,073182)
0,048782	  
(0,290583)
0,144285	  
(0,308810)
-­‐0,079674	  
(0,205731)
-­‐0,100806	  
(0,218635)
0,12324	  
(0,083236)
0,123377	  
(0,088457)
-­‐0,276262	  
(0,165742)
-­‐0,292643	  
(0,176138)
0,282654	  
(0,961827)
0,248635	  
(1,022157)
0,001836	  
(0,006793)
0,002133	  
(0,007219)
-­‐5,910005	  
(9,961827)
-­‐0,000114	  
(0,000106)
0,012041	  
(0,099241)
0,019849	  
(0,105466)
0,113917	  
(0,118890)
0,079226	  
(0,126347)
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variables were able to explain the variations in payment method. However, this supports the 
evidence of no endogeneity for the explanatory variable credit rating level.  
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5 Analysis 
The following chapter aims at comparing the empirical results with the mentioned theory in 
chapter 2. We will present differences and similarities between the two and make an analysis. In 
the end of the chapter a section with limitations will be discussed, which possibly can restrict the 
study.  
 
From the descriptive statistics one can see that firms who pay with cash have similar 
characteristics as firms with credit rating. However, it does not necessarily mean that firms 
with credit ratings are paying with cash. The data shows that firms with credit ratings are on 
average larger and have more debt than firms without rating, which suggests that it takes 
some time for a firm to achieve a credit rating and requires a firm to have certain amount of 
debt. Furthermore, this is in line with the findings from Faulkender and Petersen (2006) who 
found that the firms holding a credit rating have on average 35% more leverage. Firms with 
credit rating also engage on average in larger deals compared to their own value, which 
indicates that they would rather pay with stock, since it may be difficult to raise such a big 
amount of debt. Rated firms are also on average covered by more analysts than unrated firms, 
which according to theory decrease information asymmetries and possibly reduce the cost 
between debt and equity as have been argued by Karampatsas et al. (2014). 
Even though the descriptive statistic gives us some indications for our sample, we need to 
look at the regressions to draw any conclusions. Our first hypothesis tests if firms with credit 
ratings are more likely to pay with cash. From our probit regression results one can see that 
credit rating is significant, but has a negative coefficient, which suggests that firms with credit 
rating would rather pay with stock. The result contradicts our predictions and it means that H1 
is not supported. It also contradicts the result from Karampatsas et al. (2014), who did not 
find any significance for credit rating. Nevertheless, the significance of the variable is 
consistent with previous studies that show that credit rating affects financing and investment 
decisions (Tang, 2009; Bannier et al., 2012; Bo et al. 2008; Kisgen, 2006, 2007). 
Although previous research also showed that credit rating has an impact on capital structure 
and financing decisions, the support for our result that firms with credit rating are more likely 
to pay with stock is more ambiguous. Findings by Tang (2009) showed that firms with credit 
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capacity. This may also be applicable for our study, but higher debt capacity may not be 
consistent with the choice of cash as payment method. Instead, the result from our study can 
be supported by Bo et al. (2008) who suggests that it is not always the case that firms want to 
maximize their debt capacity. Our results imply that firms instead of maximizing their debt 
levels rather want to leave space for the possibility of raising additional debt in the future if 
needed. Another explanation to the results might be that issuing debt results in restrictions by 
the creditors and Lemmon and Zender (2010) argued that equity issuance is mainly driven by 
debt capacity concerns. Firms may want to maintain their financial flexibility and not raise 
debt as long as the associated costs of raising debt are higher than the one’s for issuing equity. 
Further explanation is that capital structure decision is also determined by a firm’s target 
ratio. Rated firms in our sample which chose to pay with stock may have reached their target 
capital structure, and do not want to issue further debt. This could be explained Harford et al. 
(2009) results that imply that when a bidder’s leverage exceeds the target level, the bidder is 
more likely to finance the acquisition with stock. 
The result of a negative credit rating impact could also be explained by the market timing 
theory. As argued by Vermaelen and Xu (2014) firms chose to issue stock when their equity 
is overvalued. Furthermore, Harford (2005) found that some mergers are driven by 
overvaluation. These theories suggest that there may be a majority of overvalued bidders in 
our sample.   
While credit rating is only significant at the 5% level, leverage and book-to-market seem to be 
the major determinants of the choice between cash and stock. The results suggest that firms 
with more leverage are more likely to pay with cash, which is in line with Harford et al. 
(2009) who found that firms with less leverage are more likely to pay with stock. However, it 
is in contradiction to Faccio and Masulis (2005) findings. They argue that bidders in stock-
dominated deals have greater growth opportunities and less leverage. Karampatsas et al. 
(2014) found as well in their study that the variable leverage was significant and had a 
positive impact. The other major determinant of payment method, book-to-market, is positive 
and firms with a high book-to-market value are more likely to pay with cash. The result 
contradicts the findings by La Bruslerie (2013) who found this relationship to be negative. On 
the other hand, it is consistent with Martin (1996) findings that firms with higher growth 
opportunities (lower book-to-market) are more likely to pay with stock. Firms with growth 
opportunities want to maintain their financial flexibility for their future investment needs to 
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be able to meet the growth expectations. The result is as well in line with the one’s from 
Karampatsas et al. (2014), who found support for the growth opportunity theory.  
Size has significant impact on payment method as shown by our regressions. Large firms are 
more diversified, hence have lower probability of default and are able to raise more debt, 
which is argued by Karampatsas et al. (2014). The variable cash flows to assets showed a 
positive and significant relationship between a bidder’s cash flow and choice of payment 
method. It suggests that higher cash flows increase the probability of cash payment. This is 
consistent with Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis (1986); managers for firms with excessive 
free cash flows more willingly use cash for their investments. This is also supported by Myers 
(1984) Pecking Order theory that firms first of all prefer to use internally generated cash. Both 
size and cash flows to assets are as well positive and have a significant impact in the study by 
Karampatsas et al. (2014). Furthermore, relative size has a negative impact on payment 
method. It implies that when the value of deal is higher than the market value of the bidder, 
the bidder may face difficulties to get enough financing from internally generated funds and 
debt, which is argued by Harford et al. (2009). Hence, if the relative size is large the bidder 
may be forced to pay with stock. 
The other variables in our regression are insignificant. Among these variables, private is the 
closest one being significant with a p-value slightly over the 10% level. The coefficient 
indicates that if a bidder acquires a private target it is more likely to pay with cash. Faccio and 
Masulis (2005) argue that private targets are usually more illiquid and their shareholders 
probably prefer cash before stock. The result is also in line with Karamptsas et al. (2014) 
findings. Since the variable is not significant we cannot draw any conclusions that support 
their study. Diversifying deals, number of analysts, run-up and collateral are further away 
from being significant. In the study by Karampatsas et al. (2014) neither diversifying deals 
nor collateral are significant, thus cannot support the theories behind them. However, they 
found significance for number of analysts, which implies that there might be differences in 
information asymmetries between the American and European market.  
 
To investigate the second research question, whether the level of credit rating influences the 
choice of financing source, regressions with credit rating level as our main variable of interest 
were conducted. Examining the results, one can see that credit rating level does not have a 
significant impact on the dependent variable payment method. Karampatsas et al. (2014) 
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found level of credit rating to be significant and positively influence the choice of payment 
method. Although, our result indicates that a higher debt capacity may not explicitly explain 
the choice of payment method. Kisgen (2006, 2007) and Tang (2009) argued that firms are 
cautious about their credit ratings, which could partly be related to our findings. Kisgen 
(2006, 2007) found that firms that are close to an upgrade or a downgrade tend to issue less 
debt. His results are supported by Tang (2009) who found that if a firm issues too much debt 
it faces the risk of being downgraded, which can lead to costly consequences, such as higher 
cost of capital and decreased access to the debt markets. Furthermore, Kliger and Sarig (2000) 
found that equity value falls when better rating is announced. This could mean that even 
though a firm has a high credit rating, hence a high debt capacity, they could choose not to 
borrow in order to maintain their rating level. As argued by Schwartz (2004) a credit rating 
reduces information asymmetries in the market, thus there could be lower information 
asymmetries among rated firms. This could lead to reduced costs associated with the pecking 
order, which may offset the benefits of raising debt. To conclude, the H2 cannot be explained 
by our findings since the results neither imply that a firm with higher level of credit rating is 
more likely to finance with cash nor with equity.  
 
The control variables, book-to-market and relative size, are significant as in the above 
regressions with credit rating. The same explanation as mentioned for their impact in the 
section above is applicable for this result. Even though book-to-market has greater impact on 
payment method in the regression with level of credit rating as explanatory variable, the 
variable is less significant than the regression with credit rating. Unlike the regression with 
credit rating, the variable run-up is now significant with a negative impact on payment 
method. It implies that the higher increase of the stock price to the announcement date, the 
more likely the firm is to pay with stock. The same negative relationship was found by 
Karampatsas et al. (2014). Furthermore, the results are in line with the suggested market 
timing theory by Vermaelen and Xu (2014). Firms try to time the market and therefore are 
more likely to pay with stock when they experience an increase in stock prices.  
Myers (1984), Jensen (1986) and Karampatsas et al. (2014) suggest a positive relationship 
between cash flow to assets and cash payment. However, we do not find any significance for 
this variable in this regression even though the coefficient is positive. It implies that a firm’s 
cash flow does not impact its choice of payment method. As argued for level of credit rating, 
an explanation could be that information asymmetries are lower for rated firms than for the 
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total sample, hence there may be decreased incentives to follow the pecking order. Leverage 
is neither significant in this regression. Faccio and Masulis (2005) and Harford et al. (2009) 
came to different conclusions for this variable, as discussed above in the section regarding 
credit rating. It indicates that the implication for leverage is biased. However, leverage was 
significant for the total sample and a possible explanation for the difference between the 
groups may be that rated firms are less restricted when it comes to leverage. Furthermore, the 
variable size is not significant in the sample for rated firms as it was for the total sample. 
Karampatsas et al. (2014) instead found the variable to be significant and had a positive 
relationship, which was argued by that larger firms are more diversified and therefore have 
lower probability of default. Nevertheless, we cannot support these findings.  
The variables collateral, number of analysts, diversifying deals and private are for the 
regressions with credit rating level as main variable of interest insignificant, as they were for 
the variable credit rating.  
None of our hypotheses are supported by the result of our sample. Credit rating is significant 
but contradicts our predictions that credit rating would give the firm higher debt capacity and 
better access to capital markets. Instead, credit rating is shown to have a negative impact on 
payment method, which implies that rated firms are more likely to pay with stock. 
Furthermore, the Hausman test revealed that we have an endogeneity problem in the sample. 
As discussed in previous chapter it may be due to selection bias and omitted variable. The 
problems are partly derived from the agency conflict; where companies to some extent may 
be able to influence their rating or whether they want to be rated or not as argued by Minescu 
(2004). The test showed that credit rating is endogenous, however there were no findings for 
the problem in level of credit rating. Although we corrected for endogeneity in both 2SLS 
regressions, the results did not deviate significantly from the original regressions with GLM 
logit and probit. 
 
5.1 Limitations 
This study has been based on data from 2000 to 2008. Hence, the results that we found are 
therefore restricted to the time frame. Moreover, even though we have taken the time period 
of a whole M&A wave into consideration, the financial crisis of 2008 could still have 
influenced some of the results due to its extensive impact. The run-up to the financial crisis 
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may have affected the payment choice of many acquisitions. Another determinant of 
investment decision that restricts the findings in our result is the fact that the different 
countries in our sample do not have the same laws and regulations. However, since all of the 
included countries are developed countries and are part of the European Union, it makes the 
sample more homogeneous. However, there might be influences regarding these differences 
that have not been accounted for and it should be noted that it might have had an impact on 
the outcome. In our sample, firms such as financial institutions and utility companies are 
included, which might have affected the outcome of our result. Other studies, like Kisgen 
(2009), excluded them because their capital structures differ extensively from other firms. 
Although, we have chosen to include them, which has been done as well in the study by 
Karampatsas et al. (2014), in order to get a more comparable result between the two studies. 
In our sample all financial institutions and utility companies are rated and a majority of these 
firms paid with stock. Hence, these observations could have influenced and given a somewhat 
misrepresented outcome.  
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6 Conclusion 
The focus in the last chapter is to give a summary of the findings and relate them to our research 
questions. The contribution of our study will be shown and the possibilities for further research 
will be discussed. 
 
 
The objective of our study was to answer the two research questions stated in the first chapter. 
The first question that we wanted to investigate was whether the choice of payment method in 
M&As is determined by the credit rating existence of the bidder. The relationship was tested 
through the hypothesis: a firm that holds a credit rating is more likely to pay with cash in 
merger or acquisition. Although our result was significant, the hypothesis was rejected. 
Instead we found that firms with credit rating are more likely to pay with stock. Our results 
suggest that firms instead of maximizing their debt levels rather want to maintain financial 
flexibility for the possible need of debt in future investments. Furthermore, firms issue equity 
due to debt capacity concerns, which could imply that firms in our sample may have reached 
their maximum debt levels. Another explanation of our result may be that the time period 
chosen have been characterized by a general overvaluation of the market, hence there have 
been more M&As driven by overvalued equity. During this period, firms might have 
experienced that the benefits of raising debt have been offset by the decreased costs of issuing 
equity.  
 
In this study, the second research question we wanted to investigate was whether the credit 
rating level of a firm affected its choice of financing source, which was tested through the 
hypothesis: a firm that holds a higher level of credit rating is more likely to finance the 
acquisition with cash. Since we did not find any significant result, we could neither reject nor 
find support for the hypothesis. Although, it could mean that even though a firm has a high 
credit rating, hence a high debt capacity, they could choose not to borrow in order to not lose 
their rating level. Instead it could be the change in rating that determines the payment method 
and not the actual level of rating of the firm. However, we have not investigated the change in 
credit rating, but the insignificance indicates that there is no clear relationship between level 
of credit rating and payment method. It is supported by previous research in this topic that the 
results are ambiguous. Another possible explanation of our insignificant result could be that 
firms with credit rating experience less information asymmetry than unrated firms. The 
assigned credit rating of a firm reduces information asymmetry in the market. Thus, rated 
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firms may have less incentive to follow the pecking order. This suggests that the level of 
credit rating does not decrease information asymmetries and neither affect choice of payment 
method. It is rather the existence of credit rating that influences the choice between cash and 
stock. Although information asymmetry has been partly controlled for, it could still have 
influenced the results to some extent.  
 
It has been argued that firms with credit rating have higher debt capacity, although we find 
significance for leverage as well. This implies, for the total sample, that leverage could 
influence the choice of payment method. However, rated firms may have less restricted debt 
capacity and better access to debt markets, which suggests that leverage only has an impact 
for unrated firms. Firms without rating may be restricted by their existing debt levels when 
they seek external financing for investment opportunities. Nevertheless, we did not find 
significance for leverage among rated firms, which support our discussion that these firms 
could be less restricted by their access to debt.  
 
Financial institutions and utility companies have been included in our study, in order to get a 
more comparable result, which could have affected the outcome. Since all of these firms were 
rated it could suggest that it is more commonly for them to hold a rating. Furthermore, the 
majority of these firms paid with stock, which could be explained by the lack of tangible 
assets, and hence less collateral when seeking external financing. These observations could 
have influenced our result by a sample of over represented firms with credit rating who paid 
with stocks. 
 
To conclude, none of our hypotheses were supported, but the circumstances could still be 
explained by previous literature within the subject of credit rating and payment method in 
M&As. Our conclusions leave space for further studies which will be discussed in the 
following section.  
 
6.1 Suggestion on Further Research 
Our sample is quite small, due to the lack of time and resources, and it would be interesting to 
see whether the result would be different on a larger sample. As mentioned previously in this 
paper, the time period chosen may have affected the support of our hypotheses. Instead the 
study could be conducted on a larger time period to capture the effect of both under- and 
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overvalued market. It would also be interesting to see the effect of the last financial crises, to 
capture the change of CRAs behaviour and a period of a truly low M&A activity.  
 
Our sample is only based on developed countries; it could be interesting to replace the sample 
with countries from emerging markets. Those markets are most often seen as less transparent 
than for developed countries, more risky and the creditworthiness is less accessible. This 
makes us believe that the outcome would probably differ significantly. 
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-­‐2,044852	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0,8490
0,014072	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Appendix 2: Hausman Test 
Credit Rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N=220 R educed S tructual	  (G LM	  logit)	  on	  raction	  of	  cash S tructual	  (probit)	  P ayment	  method
C oefficient P -­‐value C oefficient P -­‐value C oefficient P -­‐value
C onstant 0,0000 0,0000 0,0020
C redit	  rating	   -­‐0,8294 0,8151
C redit	  rating	  fitted	  value -­‐0,0241 0,0533
Industry	  fraction 0,0000
R egulated	  industry 0,9898
ln(s ize) 0,0010 -­‐0,0295 0,0162
L everage 0,0026 -­‐0,0022 0,0005
C ollateral	   0,3332 -­‐0,2617 0,6841
Book-­‐to-­‐market 0,0419 -­‐0,0022 0,0039
R un-­‐up 0,0649 -­‐0,5848 0,3775
C ash	  flows	  to	  assets 0,1992 -­‐0,6281 0,0678
Number	  of	  analys ts 0,2790 -­‐0,6050 0,7401
R elative	  s ize 0,2369 -­‐0,4693 0,1324
Divers ifying	  deals 0,9707 -­‐0,3640 0,3205
Private 0,3679 -­‐0,0810 0,1145
F -­‐statis tic 77,64440 0,0000
R -­‐square 0,818219
Adjusted	  R -­‐square 0,807681
Pseudo	  R -­‐square 0,141103
-­‐0,619183***	  
(0,126416)
-­‐1,320730***	  
(0,284491)
-­‐3,719566***	  
(1,201312)
0,030694	  
(0,142460)
-­‐0,125691	  
(0,537402)
-­‐0,479573**	  
(0,212639)
-­‐1,485375* 
(0,768503)
0,706198***	  
(0,053241)
0,000845	  
(0,066166)
0,061344***	  
(0,018335)
0,088884*	  
(0,040830)
0,407375**	  
(0,169405)
0,259620***	  
(0,085266)
0,538801***	  
(0,176071)
2,496463***	  
(0,715155)
0,064364	  
(0,066352)
0,150504	  
(0,134093)
0,201029	  
(0,494129)
0,055502**	  
(0,027112)
0,141937***	  
(0,046431)
0,963873***	  
(0,334028)
-­‐0,076288*	  
(0,041104)
-­‐0,046215	  
(0,084584)
-­‐0,255416	  
(0,289436)
0,372545	  
(0,289279)
0,278738	  
(0,575509)
4,199928*	  
(2,299944)
0,002646	  
(0,002438)
0,002818	  
(0,005449)
-­‐0,006098	  
(0,018380)
5,220005	  	  	  
(4,40005)
-­‐7,120005	  
(9,840005)
-­‐0,000454	  
(0,000302)
-­‐0,001121	  
(0,030469)
-­‐0,057060	  
(0,062854)
-­‐0,225362	  
(0,226836)
0,042196	  
(0,046758)
0,172513*	  
(0,098858)
0,511350	  	  	  
(0,323989)
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Credit Rating Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N=78 R educed S tructual	  (G LM	  logit)	  on	  faction	  of	  cash S tructual	  (probit)	  on	  payment	  method
C oefficient P -­‐value C oefficient P -­‐value C oefficient P -­‐value
C onstant 0,2241 -­‐0,4526 -­‐0,1777
L evel	  of	  credit	  rating	   -­‐0,8728 -­‐0,3379
-­‐0,6549 -­‐0,4969
Industry	  level 0,0000
R egulated	  industry 0,6806
ln(s ize) 0,5244 -­‐0,5898 -­‐0,5925
L everage 0,1903 -­‐0,9897 -­‐0,1566
C ollateral	   0,2237 -­‐0,6558 -­‐0,5184
Book-­‐to-­‐market 0,2807 -­‐0,1834 -­‐0,0249
R un-­‐up 0,3967 -­‐0,0683437967 -­‐0,0936 -­‐0,0593
C ash	  flows	  to	  assets 0,2454 -­‐0,9464 -­‐0,3364
Number	  of	  analys ts 0,8766 -­‐0,7657 -­‐0,6278
R elative	  s ize 0,8263 -­‐0,5758 -­‐0,0486
Divers ifying	  deals 0,8647 -­‐0,9699 -­‐0,5648
Private 0,2624 -­‐0,2915 -­‐0,1891
F -­‐statis tic 27,97211 0,0000
R -­‐square 0,83777
Adjusted	  R -­‐square 0,80782
Pseudo	  R -­‐square 0,183563
2,419553	  
(1,971141)
-­‐0,612693	  
(0,815786)
-­‐4,394106	  
(3,260083)
0,007503	  
(0,046883)
0,14152	  
(0,147661)
L evel	   of	   credit	   rating	  
fitted	  value
-­‐0,026016	  
(0,058207)
-­‐0,115619	  
(0,170200)
0,993532***	  
(0,068333)
0,164718	  
(0,398343)
-­‐0,140600	  
(0,219695)
0,048179	  
(0,089373)
0,164603	  
(0,307580)
-­‐1,237602	  
(0,935165)
-­‐0,004328	  
(0,336014)
2,241031	  
(1,581865)
0,789389	  
(0,642643)
-­‐0,128846	  
(0,289098)
-­‐0,546193	  
(0,845713)
-­‐0,288254	  
(0,265005)
0,110194	  
(0,082831)
2,085383**	  
(0,929686)
-­‐0,451865	  
(0,529635)
-­‐1,456341*	  
(0,772189)
-­‐3,530459	  
(3,011837)
0,075093	  
(1,116953)
5,064136	  
(5,268158)
0,003359	  
(0,021544)
0,002633	  
(0,008837)
0,015867	  
(0,032727)
-­‐6,940005	  
(0,000315)
-­‐6,950005	  
(0,000124)
-­‐0,000964**	  
(0,000489)
0,053756	  
(0,314147)
-­‐0,004919	  
(0,130165)
0,250981	  
(0,435891)
-­‐0,436666	  
(0,386226)
0,165088	  
(0,156503)
0,695076	  
(0,529239)
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Appendix 3: Definition of Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Definition
Panel	  A :	  measures 	  of	  payment	  method
F raction	  of	  cash F raction	  of	  cash	  as 	  part	  of	  the	  total	  price	  offered	  by	  the	  bidder	  to	  the	  target	  shareholders .
Payment	  method
Panel	  B:	  credit	  rating	  variable
C redit	  rating Dummy	  variable:	  1	  for	  rated	  bidders ,	  0	  for	  unrated	  bidders .	  
L evel	  of	  credit	  rating C ontinuous 	  variable	  for	  rated	  bidders :	  1-­‐22,	  highest	  rating	  takes 	  22	  and	  lowest	  rating	  takes 	  1.
Investment	  grade
Panel	  C :	  firm	  characteris tics
S ize Market	  value	  of	  equity	  4	  weeks 	  prior	  to	  the	  acquis ition	  announcement	  in	  €	  million.	  
L everage
C ollateral
Book-­‐to-­‐market	  (B /M)
R un-­‐up
C ash	  flows	  to	  assets
Number	  of	  analysts T he	  number	  of	  equity	  analysts 	  following	  the	  firm.
Panel	  D:	  deal	  characteris tics
R elative	  s ize T he	  ratio	  of	  the	  deal	  value	  to	  bidder's 	  market	  value	  of	  equity	  4	  weeks 	  prior	  to	  the	  acquis ition	  announcement.
Divers ifying	  deals
P rivate Dummy	  variable:	  1	  for	  private	  targets ,	  0	  for	  public	  targets .	  
Panel	  E :	  instrumental	  variables
Industry	  fraction
Industry	  level	  
R egulated	  industry
Dummy	  variable:	  1	  for	  deals 	  financed	  with	  more	  than	  50% 	  cash,	  0	  for	  deals 	  financed	  with	  more	  than	  50% 	  
stock.
Dummy	  variable:	  1	  for	  investment	  grade	  bidders 	  (above	  BBB /Baa2),	  0	  for	  speculative	  grade	  bidders 	  (below	  
BB B/Baa2)
Total	  financial	  debt	  divided	  by	  the	  book	  value	  of	  total	  assets 	  in	  the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  to	  the	  acquis ition	  
announcement.
T he	  ratio	  of	  property,	  plant	  and	  equipment	  to	  total	  assets 	  in	  the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  to	  the	  acquis ition	  
announcement.	  
Book	  value	  of	  equity	  in	  the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  to	  the	  acquis ition	  announcement	  divided	  by	  the	  market	  value	  of	  
equity	  4	  weeks 	  prior	  to	  the	  acquis ition	  announcement.	  
Market-­‐adjusted	  buy-­‐and-­‐hold	  returns 	  of	  the	  firm	  over	  the	  period	  starting	  (-­‐205,	  -­‐6)	  days 	  prior	  to	  the	  
acquis ition	  announcement.	  
Income	  before	  extraordinary	  items	  plus 	  deprectiation	  minus 	  dividends 	  on	  common	  and	  preferred	  stock	  
divided	  by	  the	  total	  assets 	  in	  the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  to	  the	  acquis ition	  announcement.	  
Dummy	  variable:	  1	  for	  inter-­‐industry	  transaction,	  0	  intra-­‐industry	  transaction.	  Industries 	  are	  defined	  at	  the	  2-­‐
digit	  S IC 	  level.
L og	  of	  1	  plus 	  the	  fraction	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  same	  3-­‐digit	  S IC 	  industry	  group	  that	  have	  credit	  ratings 	  the	  fiscal	  
year	  prior	  to	  the	  acquis ition	  announcement.	  
T he	  median	  credit	  level	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  same	  3-­‐digit	  S IC 	  industry	  group	  the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  acquis ition	  
announcement.	  
Dummy	  variable:	  1	  if	  firms	  is 	  a	  financial	  institution	  (1-­‐digit	  S IC 	  level	  6)	  or	  a	  utility	  firm	  (2-­‐digit	  S IC 	  level	  49),	  0	  
otherwise.
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Appendix 4: Distribution of Credit Ratings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Each countries contribution to GDP 	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